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On fuzzy frontiers and fragmented foundations: some reflections on the original and new institutional economics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 July 2014

GEOFFREY M. HODGSON
GEOFFREY M. HODGSON*
Affiliation:
Hertfordshire Business School, University of Hertfordshire, Hatfield, Hertfordshire AL10 9AB, UK
*
*Email: g.m.hodgson@herts.ac.uk
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Abstract

These reflections are prompted by the papers by Ménard (2014) and Ménard and Shirley (2014). Their essays centre on the path-breaking contributions to the ‘new institutional economics’ (NIE) by Ronald Coase, Douglass North and Oliver Williamson. In response, while recognising their substantial achievements, it is pointed out that these three thinkers had contrasting views on key points. Furthermore, Ménard's and Shirley's three ‘golden triangle’ NIE concepts – transaction costs, property rights and contracts – are themselves disputed. Once all this is acknowledged, differences of view appear within the NIE, raising interesting questions concerning its identity and boundaries, including its differences with the original institutionalism. There are sizeable overlaps between the two traditions. It is argued here that the NIE can learn from the original institutionalism, particularly when elaborating more dynamic analyses, and developing more nuanced, psychologically-grounded and empirically viable theories of human motivation.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Institutional Economics , Volume 10 , Issue 4: The Future of Institutional and Evolutionary Economics , December 2014 , pp. 591 - 611
Copyright
Copyright © Millennium Economics Ltd 2014 

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