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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 July 2014
Prometheus Bound (PV) is a meditation on God par excellence, second only perhaps to the Bible or Paradise Lost. It is, accordingly, the only extant tragedy from the ancient world featuring the most characters as gods. For this reason it stands out in a genre fixated principally on human suffering, where ‘death carries overwhelmingly more weight than salvation’. Gods, of course, do not suffer like humans: Prometheus, the play's protagonist extraordinaire, may be subject to an eternity of punishment for stealing fire from Zeus, but his pain, real and visceral as it is, differs from ours in that it lacks the potential closure of death. It is perhaps justifiable then to suggest the play's focus is not just the awful things gods are capable of doing to one another (just like humans), but rather the meaning of such behaviour without the ultimate consequence (death). That is, the portrayal of Prometheus suffering and Zeus menacing redounds equally to the type of characters they are as to simply what they are. Whereas the former aspect is of psychological or political interest, the latter is a theological concern. And PV is theological in its implications as much as it is political. Hence the question: What type of theology does it convey? The answer is complex.
In the modern world PV has primarily been read for its political allegory—as a meditation on oppression, or martyrdom for the intellectual cause. Eric Havelock's translation and study of the play, to cite an illustrative example, was called The Crucifixion of Intellectual Man (1950). Many critics therefore argue that the play articulates the conflict between Prometheus and Zeus in terms of freedom versus authoritarianism. As Shelley famously wrote in the prologue to his Prometheus Unbound, the imprisoned Prometheus represents ‘the highest perfection of moral and intellectual nature impelled by the purest and the truest motives to the best and noblest ends’ (1820). Marx and Goethe felt similarly. This position aligns Prometheus with the forces of enlightenment and progress over against the brutality of Zeus's authority.
1. I proceed—admittedly, with little investment—under the somewhat controversial assumption that Aeschylus is the author of PV. The debate about its authenticity, however, has raged back and forth for many years now. Cf. Solmsen (1949), Podlecki (1966 and 2005), Herington (1970 and 1979), Conacher (1980), Griffith (1983), Said (1985), Martin West (1990), Marzullo (1993), Bees (1993) and Stephanie West (2005). I defer primarily to Griffith (1977), who has most thoroughly argued that the play is not from Aeschylus' hand. The problem is vexed, though, as Lloyd-Jones (2003), 54, makes clear: ‘If the play is not authentic, it is remarkable that no ancient author seems to have suspected it.’
2. I have borrowed this observation from Buxton (2009), though the essay from which it comes is not apposite to my argument here.
3. Not that critics haven't deemed it otherwise—cf. M. West (1990), 63: ‘The Zeus of Prometheus has no redeeming feature… [I]t is difficult to believe that Aeschylus thought Zeus had ever been what he is in Prometheus… The theology of Prometheus is no theology at all.’
4. See, most recently, Carter (2007), esp. ch.2.
5. See, for example, Greene (1968), 122f.
6. Goethe, ‘Prometheus’ (1773): ‘Hier sitz ich, forme Menschen / Nach meinem Bilde, / Ein Geschlecht, das mir gleich sei, / Zu leiden, zu weinen, / Zu geniessen, zu freuen sich, / Und dein nicht zu achten,/ Wie ich!’
7. See Podlecki (1966), 101-22. For the ‘anthropological’ allegory see Bouvrie (1993). Fowler (1957), 180, makes the interesting case that the allegorical opposition between Zeus and Prometheus is one of tyranny and aristocracy. Cf. also Griffith (1995).
8. Wecklein ([1878] 1981), 7-19, and Dodds (1973), 26-44, for example, suggested Prometheus' mistake was to challenge Zeus during the precarious time of his political succession. Griffith (1995), 109, has also pointed out the simple polarity (democracy/tyranny) that tends to underwrite judgments about the play. Stephanie West (2005), 317, has recently claimed that ‘in [Prometheus’] increasing intransigence we see a growing resemblance to the tyrant against whom he is rebelling.'
9. S. West (2005) falls back ultimately on a political interpretation along the lines of Wecklein and Dodds. Rehm (2003), 47, baldly asserts, ‘Zeus exhibits a typical tyrant's paranoia and desperation, fearing his own fall from authority’. And Podlecki (2005), 34-37, offers only a quick outline of the issue. White (2001) and Vandvik (1943), whom I call upon frequently below, are notable exceptions but tend to be ignored or dismissed. Vandvik's small but forceful monograph seems not to have had much influence. Cf. the judgments of Solmsen (1949), 124 n.1, 135 n.57 and esp. 140 n.79, and Unterberger (1968), 78 n.81. Podlecki (2005), 36, does not mention Vandvik but characterises White's argument as ‘ingenious’, presumably not as a compliment. Cf. S. West (2005), 315: ‘We may find it surprising that the extraordinary portrayal of Zeus did not attract more attention.’
10. As Benjamin Fortson (2004), 27, points out, the conflation of Prometheus with his intellectual faculty is the result of a folk etymology; linguistically his name means ‘Fire-stealer’ and thus associates him with other Indo-European tricksters. This does not mean, of course, that the folk etymology carries no weight. Podlecki (2005), 3, cites Alcman (F 64) to suggest that by the end of the seventh century BCE ‘word-formations in Prom- were in use as proper (significant) names, and that what they signified was “Fore-knower”’. Cf. Griffith (1983), 2 n.5.
11. See Miller (1978) on the combination of Promethean and Epimethean elements in the character of Prometheus in Plato's Protagoras.
12. Solmsen (1949), 149, 152.
13. Contrast the recent effort by Bees (2009), wholly committed to showing that Aeschylus is essentially concerned with ‘die Gerechtigkeit des Zeus’ (esp. 260-309). PV is a ‘bewuβte Provokation gegen den echten Aischylos’: ‘Der Gerechtigkeit des Zeus…die Ungerechtigkeit eines tyrannischen Gottes gegenübergestellt’ (260). Martin (2004), 9f., sees in Hesiod a ‘broader picture of Zeus and Prometheus as co-equal creators’, a ‘diptych about alternative models of creation’.
14. Rosenmeyer (1955), 250.
15. Like, for example, that of Reinhardt (1949), 12, who believed ‘mit dem Regiekünstler entwickelt sich zugleich in Aischylos der Theologe’; or Nestle (1930), passim but esp. 256 and 263, who strove to discover the Religiosität of Aeschylus but found something closer to Christianity. When Nestle's essay was reprinted in Hommel (1974), Taplin (1977) dismissed it as old-fashioned in favour of Rosenmeyer.
16. Cf. Schmid (1929), 97ff., Fitton-Brown (1959), Rosenmeyer (1963), 51-102, Griffith (1977), 13-15 and 246-52, Bees (1997); Taplin (1975) makes an especially forceful claim for this likelihood. For the development of Zeus through the trilogy, see esp. Unterberger (1968), 138, who offers the most systematic treatment of PV's forward-looking moments while at the same time maintaining PV itself gives no evidence of Zeus's evolution: ‘Wie ist die Veränderung zu verstehen? Jedenfalls nicht im Sinne einer psychologischen Entwicklung. Rational betrachtet, sind es die Göttervorstellungen, die sich wandeln… Zeus ändert seine Politik, nicht mehr und nicht weniger.’
17. See Griffith (1983), 281-305.
18. Parker (1998), 159, has argued that the term tyrannis did not by the time of PV's composition necessarily connote brutality but rather power held without monarchical succession. He contends, however, that of Aeschylus' tragedies only PV exhibits both the neutral connotation and its later connotation of violence. Cf. Griffith (1995), 96 n.114, and Crane (1996). White (2001), 130 n.89, points out that ‘Zeus's rule, while repeatedly labelled tyranny, is never called despotic’.
19. All translations are my own.
20. Cf. PV 38: τò σòν…γέϱας (‘your privilege’).
21. Cf. the same juxtaposition of 120f.: τòν Διòς ἐχθϱóν, τòν πᾶσι θεοῖς / δι’ ἀπεχθείας ἐλθóνθ’ (‘[Have a look at me,] the enemy of Zeus, the one who has incurred the wrath of all the gods’).
22. One could speculate then that the privilege of giving fire to humans belonged to Zeus: to give it to them in charity, not have them receive it in an underhanded way.
23. Pace Unterberger (1968), 29.
24. On the relationship between sight and power in the play, see Larmour (1992).
25. For discussion and overview of the function of the Io-scene and its integration in the play, see Bouvrie (1993), 192-95, 203.
26. White (2001), 120 n.45, notes that PV does not address ‘why Zeus chose Io and why she migrates to Egypt’. Dorter (1992), 128-33, strikes a good balance between Zeus's ‘mere lust’ or ‘selfish obsession’ with Io and his ‘(perhaps penitent) curing’ of her.
27. See White (2001), 115, on the uncivilised world Io must travel. For Prometheus' ‘parageography’ see Bouvrie (1993), S. West (1997), Finkelberg (1998) and White (2001).
28. Vandvik (1943) and White (2001) treat the Io episode as theodicy. There is merit to this argument: White sees ritual influence in the description of Io's torture, and Vandvik rightly notes that Io's ‘present affliction is the consequence of Hera's jealousy’ (59). I still find it difficult either to sublimate her pain as an initiation or to pass the buck from Zeus to Hera.
29. It is not unjustifiable to believe that the revelations of the Io scene vindicate Prometheus' foresight: that what he says about Io turns out to be true (at least in later traditions) lends force to his predictions about Zeus. But Prometheus' foresight is also an aspect of his belief in the systematicity of the cosmos, so his revelations to Io are more than just an objective explanation of the truth. They are also his platform for assuming he knows the workings of the universe. Even granting that Prometheus is right about Io, what is there to necessitate the same regarding his knowledge of Zeus? Io and Zeus are not of the same standing, so perhaps what one can know of the course of human life bears no relation to what one can know about that of divine life. Perhaps more importantly, Prometheus heard the secret about Thetis from his mother Gaia/Themis, which means his knowledge about the future is limited too. Gaia, as most scholars assume, played the role in Lyomenos (like Oceanus, i.e. a ‘blocking’ character?) of trying to convince Prometheus to reconcile with Zeus. And as we know from Hesiod, she was the one who eventually warned Zeus about Metis. Why would Prometheus assume she wouldn't eventually do the same with regard to Thetis? His assumption then that he has the upper hand is meant to look like a delusion. Contrast Griffith (1983), 8 n.26: ‘It is true that P.'s prophetic knowledge is shared by his mother, Ge-Themis, who theoretically could intervene of her own accord to save Zeus; but there is no hint of this in Prom.’ This despite the fact, as Griffith notes a few pages earlier (5), that the more ‘immediate source’ for Prometheus' knowledge of the secret, Pindar's eighth Isthmian ode (27-46), gives Themis—at the advice of the other gods—warning Zeus and Poseidon about the threat of marrying Thetis. Vandvik (1943), 34, understood this: ‘The coercive means which he has found in it and which is his great comfort throughout the play only exists in his own imagination. The future was unknown to Zeus only till he was warned.’
30. Solmsen (1949), 160, sees an allusion to the curse Ouranos pronounces against Kronos upon his own usurpation in Theogony.
31. Griffith (1983), 249 ad loc. That is, unless it was mentioned in Prometheus Pyrphoros. For a good discussion of whether this play was the first or last of a trilogy, see Fitton-Brown (1959) and Podlecki (2005).
32. Griffith (1983), 16. See PV 169-71, 188-92, 258, 511-25, 757-59, 907-40, 955-59.
33. PV 211-13, 511-14, 515, 518, 772.
34. Griffith (1983), 19 (cf. also 16). Here I also agree in part with White (2001), 115 n.35, who suspects that Prometheus ‘misinterprets his “secret”, that Zeus only appears to be at risk, and that the marriage of Thetis to Peleus was eventually revealed to be part of his plan’. Podlecki (2005) is not convinced. But see also Vandvik (1943), Unterberger (1968) and Conacher (1980).
35. The scholiast on lines 120ff. states that ‘Even the gods were angry at Prometheus because of the fire. For as a result humans had everything easily for the remainder and no longer consistently gave sacrifice’ (citation in Vandvik [1943], 29).
36. To be sure, the verb (αἰϰίζεται, 256) picks up verbatim the chorus's earlier question: ‘For what reason has Zeus snatched you up and continuously tortured you so dishonourably and harshly?’ (PV 194f.)
37. Vandvik (1943), 45, believes this judgment ‘in the mouth of the chorus can only signify the ethical error, the fire theft’, not a more pointed criticism of Prometheus' behaviour. For him as for Winnington-Ingram (1983), 176, the chorus is ‘superficial’, ‘inconstant’ and given to ‘shallow compassion and naïve admiration of the prisoner’ (42f.).
38. Griffith (1983), 179 ad loc.
39. Unterberger (1968), 80, picks up on this distinction but takes it a step too far: ‘Zeus hat den Kairos der Gefährdung überdauert—er kann demnach nicht “schwächer” sein ais Moiren und Erinyen. 1st er also stärker, kann er ihre Gesetze null und nichtig machen? Keineswegs.’ The question, however, is not whether Zeus is stronger or weaker than the Moirai and Erinyes (or their laws), but whether his ability to sidestep the threat of Thetis is to render their authority ‘null und nichtig’. Simply put, it isn't. It is rather to suggest, perhaps provocatively, that the Moirai and Erinyes don't work by means of inflexible laws.
40. Bollack (2006), 80 (cf. 87 n.3), has some interesting, if ultimately unsubstantiated, ideas about Prometheus' silence regarding this semnon. This he sees not as a substantive secret about Thetis (cf. Bremer 1988 ad loc.: ‘Es ist wohl ein Geheimnis…’) but the mysterious logic of the cosmos, which would necessarily be off-limits to the chorus. The central problem, though, is not whether Prometheus' secret has banal positive content or provides access to the architecture of the universe—because Prometheus clearly believes they are related—but what he thinks it means: that it gives him an advantage over Zeus.
41. Cf. Vandvik (1943), 46f.: ‘Oceanus is speaking to the deluded prisoner who just needs to become acquainted with his dubious disposition.’
42. Vandvik (1943), 47, however, is probably right to suggest that this is no criticism of Zeus: ‘In the mouth of the speaker the adjective can only mean “strict”, for the character of Oceanus renders a pejorative sense impossible.’
43. Prometheus responds to Oceanus: ‘You're right, but only if you apply them to the heart at the right time, and not pressure a swollen spirit by force’ (379f.). These words cut both ways. For Prometheus the right time means when he thinks it will be advantageous to him. But why would he think Oceanus is there to pressure him? In his pride he assumes Oceanus, who comes of his own accord and makes a demonstrable show of his sympathy, is just another of Zeus's henchmen. As Conacher (1980), 46, points out, ‘however sound Prometheus’ timing and his confidence in his hidden knowledge, there is in this exchange an irony at his expense as well'.
44. This is White's formulation (White [2001], 129 n.85), though he does not endorse it: ‘An impartial reading of his lines, by themselves and uncoloured by Prometheus' abuse, gives a favourable impression… His is the voice of reason astonished at Prometheus' insolent folly.’
45. Cf. Griffith (1983), 254 ad loc., on Hermes' opening words: ‘[A] peremptory and belligerent mode of address, in sharp contrast to the customary civilities of tragic dialogue.’
46. One final thing is noteworthy in this passage: Hermes asks Prometheus to divulge his secret without riddle (μηδὲν αἰνιϰτηϱίως, 949) and not force him to make two trips down to him. Hermes implies, first, that one trip is all it takes for Prometheus to change his present misfortunes—Zeus will be willing to accommodate him if he cooperates. And second, that Hermes would be willing to make two trips means Zeus would probably be open to renegotiation.
47. Vandvik (1943), 36f.
48. Cf. Griffith (1983), 263 ad loc.: ‘Here…the audience is faced squarely with the question whether P.'s conduct is morally, or practically, appropriate. The answer remains unclear.’
49. Cf. Rosenmeyer (1963), 93: Prometheus is ‘surrounded by the Oceanids and responding to the voices of his tempters with a roar of his own. The breakers are not all hostile; the daughters of Ocean certainly are not. But Prometheus treats them as if they were; his special nature does not acknowledge friends. Both visually and spiritually he merges with the rock.’
50. Even if the chorus is a group of ‘simple-minded’ (so Winnington-Ingram) but sympathetic observers of the suffering of the major players, they are not negligible. They take a stand at Prometheus' side in the final few lines, a feat of courage that critics have not left unremarked: see Griffith (1983), 11.
51. Vandvik (1943), 36f.
52. Rosenmeyer (1963), 98f.
53. In his recent inaugural lecture at Ohio State University (March 2009) Bruce Heiden remarked that Zeus need not fear dethronement because technically he has no throne. He is the king, to be sure, but his throne does not entail domination.
54. Cf. the perceptive remarks of Rosenmeyer (1963), 92 and 95: ‘Prometheus the fire-bringer, the founder of social organisation, the champion of philanthropic intercourse, does not, in his own dramatic person, know the pleasures of friendship or sociability. His mode of existence is loneliness… Deprived as the hero is of other forms of expression, he is all speech, all lecture and remonstrance… The philanthropist despises men too much to consider them equal participants in discourse. His heroism, his superiority, carries with it the necessary adjunct of contempt. He is torn between silence and speech, with the result that the words which he utters seem to be addressed to himself rather than to anyone about him. Monologue and harangue rather than conversation… Irony, bitterness, resignation, bombast; these are some of the moods supporting Prometheus' speech.’
55. Lloyd-Jones (2003), responding to M. West's (1990) reappraisal (and re-negation) of PV's authenticity. See also Lloyd-Jones (1983), 79-103.
56. Eagleton (2008), 19; cf. also Eagleton (2003), 101-52
57. This quotation I have taken from Norman Mailer's tribute to Sartre, which was featured in The Nation's coverage of the centennial anniversary of Sartre's birth (2005).
58. Cf. Eagleton (2003), 109: ‘For Christian faith…God sees what I will freely do in the future because he is omniscient, not because he forces me to do it. Nor can God foretell what is inevitably going to happen, since in an open-ended universe there is no such thing as what is inevitably going to happen, and thus nothing to be foretold. Even the Almighty cannot see what doesn't exist.’
59. Griffith (1983), 93 ad loc. Cf. Unterberger (1968), 30: ‘Dies führt wiederum auf die neuen Machtverhältnisse, die…ihre eindeutigste Charakterisierung erfahren’ (my emphasis).
60. Eagleton (2006), 33.
61. Unterberger (1968), 138.
62. White (2001), 132.
63. Pace Konstan (1977), 67.
64. White (2001), 133.
65. Ibid.
66. Rosenmeyer (1963), 75.
