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Divine Poiesis and Abstract Entities

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2008

William L. Power
William L. Power
Affiliation:
Department of Religion, University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia 30602-1625
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Extract

According to Anselm, God is understood as a being than which nothing greater can be conceived. God is the greatest possible being. In this tradition, which has come to be spoken of as Anselmian theology or perfect being theology, God is conceived or described as that spiritual or personal being who manifests the greatest possible array of unique and compossible great making attributes and characteristics that distinguishes God from all other beings and assures God's status as the only being who is worthy of unconditional worship. This notion of God as the absolutely perfect being is one that is shared by classical and neoclassical theists alike.

Type
Research Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 30 , Issue 3 , September 1994 , pp. 335 - 341
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1994

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References

1 Plantinga, Alvin, Does God Have A Nature? (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980), pp. 1–4.Google Scholar

2 Ibid. p. 5.

3 This constitutes a brief summary of Plantinga's discussion throughout his book.

4 Morris, Thomas V., Anselmian Explorations (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), p. 171.Google Scholar The article, ‘Absolute Creation’ was originally published in American Philosophical Quarterly, 23, 4 (10 1986).Google ScholarMenzel, extended the discussion of abstract entities to mathematics in ‘Theism, Platonism, and the Metaphysics of Mathematics,’ Faith and Philosophy, 4, 4 (10 1986), 365–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

5 Ibid. p. 166.

6 Plantinga, Alvin, ‘How to Be an Anti-Realist,’ American Philosophical Association Proceedings and Addresses, 56, 1 (09 1982), 70.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

7 In addition to the works cited in note 4, Morris has discussed absolute creation in his Our Idea of God: An Introduction to Philosophical Theology (Downers Grove: Intervarsity Press, 1991). See Chapter 8.Google Scholar

8 Davison, Scott A., ‘Could Abstract Objects Depend upon God?’, Religious Studies, 27, 4 (12 1991), 1, 485–97.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

9 Ibid. p. 489.

10 Davison comments: ‘It seems that M & M's [Morris and Menzel] account of the creation of abstract objects involves something like the neo-platonic notion of emanation, rather than the traditional theistic notion of creation (which is typically viewed as free in the strong sense that God could have created different things of nothing at all.’ However, he does not see this view of abstracta as an alternative to his own position or that of M & M. This is exactly the move I want to make.

11 An excellent discussion of the use and meaning of these terms is found in Prestige, G. L., God in Patristic Thought (London: S.P.C.K., 1952), pp. 37–54, 242–64.Google Scholar

12 This paper benefited from discussion with Scott Davison at recent Society for Philosophy of Religion meetings and from a helpful suggestion of William Hasker in correspondence.