Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-7c8c6479df-995ml Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-03-28T22:56:53.283Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

8 - Computing Optimal Randomized Resource Allocations for Massive Security Games

from PART III - EFFICIENT ALGORITHMS FOR MASSIVE SECURITY GAMES

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 January 2012

Get access

Summary

Introduction

Providing security for transportation systems, computer networks, and other critical infrastructure is a large and growing problem. Central to many of these security problems is a resource allocation task. For example, a police force may have limited personnel to conduct patrols, operate checkpoints, and conduct random searches. Other scarce resources including bomb-sniffing canines, vehicles, and security cameras. The key question is how to efficiently allocate these resources to protect against a wide variety of potential threats.

The adversarial aspect of security domains poses unique challenges for resource allocation. A motivated attacker can gather information about security measures using surveillance and plan more effective attacks. Predictable resource allocations may be exploited by an attacker, greatly reducing resource effectiveness. A better approach for deploying security resources is to use randomization to increase the uncertainty of potential attackers. We develop new computational methods that use game-theoretic analysis to generate optimal randomized resource allocations for security domains.

Game theory offers a more sophisticated approach to randomization than simply “rolling dice.” It allows the analyst to factor differential risks and values into the game model, and incorporates game-theoretic predictions of how the attacker will respond to a given security policy. Recent work by Paruchuri et al. uses a game-theoretic approach to create randomized security policies for traffic checkpoints and canine patrols at the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), which are deployed in the daily airport-security operations (Paruchuri et al., 2008; Pita et al., 2008).

Type
Chapter
Information
Security and Game Theory
Algorithms, Deployed Systems, Lessons Learned
, pp. 156 - 176
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2011

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

R., Avenhaus, B., von Stengel, and S., Zamir. Inspection games. In R. J., Aumann and S., Hart, editors, Handbook of Game Theory, volume 3, chapter 51, pages 1947–1987. North-Holland, Amsterdam, 2002.Google Scholar
T., Basar and G. J., Olsder. Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory. Academic Press, San Diego, CA, 2nd edition, 1995.Google Scholar
M., Breton, A., Alg, and A., Haurie. Sequential Stackelberg equilibria in two-person games. Optimization Theory and Applications, 59(1):71–97, 1988.Google Scholar
V., Conitzer and T., Sandholm. Computing the optimal strategy to commit to. In ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2006.Google Scholar
N., Gatti. Game theoretical insights in strategic patrolling: Model and algorithm in normal-form. In European Conference on AI (CAI), 2008.Google Scholar
A., Jiang and K., Leyton-Brown. A polynomial-time algorithm for action-graph games. In Artificial Intelligence, 679–684, 2006.Google Scholar
D., Koller and B., Milch. Multi-agent influence diagrams for representing and solving games. Games and Economic Behavior, 45(1):181–221, 2003.Google Scholar
G., Leitmann. On generalized Stackelberg strategies. Optimization Theory and Applications, 26(4):637–643, 1978.Google Scholar
R. D., Luce and H., Raiffa. Games and Decisions. John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1957. Dover republication 1989.Google Scholar
M. J., Osbourne and A., Rubinstein. A Course in Game Theory. MIT Press, 1994.Google Scholar
P., Paruchuri, J. P., Pearce, J., Marecki, M., Tambe, F., Ordonez, and S., Kraus. Playing games with security: An efficient exact algorithm for Bayesian Stackelberg games. In International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), 2008.Google Scholar
J., Pita, M., Jain, C., Western, C., Portway, M., Tambe, F., Ordonez, S., Kraus, and P., Parachuri. Depoloyed ARMOR protection: The application of a game-theoretic model for security at the Los Angeles International Airport. In International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS) (Industry Track), 2008.Google Scholar
T., Roughgarden. Stackelberg scheduling strategies. SIAM Journal on Computing, 33(2):332–350, 2004.Google Scholar
T., Sandler and D. G. A. M. Terrorism and game theory. Simulation and Gaming, 34(3):319–337, 2003.Google Scholar
V., Srivastava, J., Neel, A. B., MacKenzie, R., Menon, L. A., Dasilva, J. E., Hicks, J. H., Reed, and R. P., Gilles. Using game theory to analyze wireless ad hoc networks. IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutuorials, 7(4), 2005.Google Scholar
H., von Stackelberg. Marktform und Gleichgewicht. Springer, Vienna, 1934.Google Scholar
B., von Stengel and S., Zamir. Leadership with commitment to mixed strategies. Technical Report London School of Economics-Centre for Discrete and Applicable Mathematics (LSE-CDAM)-2004-01, CDAM Research Report, 2004.
K., wei Lye and J. M., Wing. Game strategies in network security. International Journal of Information Security, 4(1–2):71–86, 2005.Google Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×