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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 July 2016
Mounting an effective international humanitarian response to a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) event, especially if the response is undertaken on an ad hoc basis, would be extremely difficult and would pose many risks to the responders. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has created a competency-based capacity to respond to at least small-scale CBRN events, including a deployable capability to undertake operational activities. This involves informed assessments of CBRN risks, timely and competent decisions on how to respond, and effectively mobilizing appropriate resources to implement these decisions, through the creation of an emergency roster. In addition to the acquisition of technical expertise and material resources, the creation of such capacity requires the application of central processes, ensuring systematic management of CBRN response (including risk-based decision-making), standing operational procedures, and availability of and access to the necessary resources. Implementation of the ICRC's CBRN response framework as described in this article should be considered by any agency or other stakeholder preparing for international humanitarian assistance in CBRN events – especially if such events are related to armed conflict.
1 Loye, Dominique and Coupland, Robin, “Who Will Assist the Victims of Use of Nuclear, Radiological, Biological or Chemical weapons – and How?”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 89, No. 866, 2007CrossRefGoogle Scholar, available at: www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_866_loye.pdf (all internet references were accessed in December 2015).
2 Ibid., p. 343.
3 Coupland, Robin and Loye, Dominique, “International Assistance for Victims of Use of Nuclear, Radiological, Biological and Chemical Weapons: Time for a Reality Check?”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 91, No. 874, 2009CrossRefGoogle Scholar, available at: www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-874-coupland-loye.pdf.
4 This may include situations where there is a risk of a pandemic or epidemic with pandemic potential, given that such events have proven links to armed conflict. For more information on the relationship between pandemics and armed conflict, see Shanks, G. Dennis, “How World War 1 Changed Global Attitudes to War and Infectious Diseases”, The Lancet, Vol. 384, No. 9955, 2014CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed.
5 “Uncertainties about releases and exposure levels, and a general lack of public understanding of the risks and adverse health effects to be expected, mean that the threat or actual release of [a] CBRN agent may evoke intense fear and other psychological reactions among the affected population. This can make it difficult to differentiate between the ‘worried well’ [and] those individuals with physical injuries or disease. It has been suggested that fear of [a] CBRN event has caused psychosomatic responses in some cases so it is important to counteract hysteria with calm advice and medical monitoring.” ICRC, Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Response: Introductory Guidance, 2014, p. 12, available at: www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication/p4175.htm.
6 Ibid.
7 In order of priority, the basic principles of life support are maintaining the airway, supporting ventilation, arresting haemorrhage and supporting circulation.
8 Malich, Gregor, Coupland, Robin, Donnelly, Steve and Baker, David, “A Proposal for Field-Level Medical Assistance in an International Humanitarian Response to Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear Events”, Emergency Medicine Journal, Vol. 30, No. 10, 2013CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed.
9 UNIDIR, An Illusion of Safety: Challenges of Nuclear Weapon Detonations for United Nations Humanitarian Coordination and Response, United Nations, 2014.
10 R. Coupland and D. Loye, above note 3.
11 G. Malich, R. Coupland, S. Donnelly and D. Baker, above note 8.
