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Private Equity Fund Compensation Contracts and Their Incentive Effects

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Abstract

This article describes compensation contracts in private equity. It shows that they may not align interest between the investors and fund managers as much as commonly thought. Certain clauses appear as potentially hazardous for investors and others exacerbate conflicts of interest.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Amsterdam Business School, Amsterdam, the Netherlands

    Ludovic Phalippou (Associate Professor of Finance)

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  1. Ludovic Phalippou
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Correspondence to Ludovic Phalippou.

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Phalippou, L. Private Equity Fund Compensation Contracts and Their Incentive Effects. Eur Bus Org Law Rev 10, 465–472 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1017/S1566752909004650

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1566752909004650

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