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The Political Economy of Imperfect Competition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2008

Amitai Etzioni
Amitai Etzioni
Affiliation:
University Professor, George Washington U, Washington DC
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Abstract

Economic actors command political power as well as economic power. It is used to the same effect to create monopolies and oligopolies. The two powers can be combined; e.g., aside from monopolies based only on economic power or only on government intervention, there are especially powerful monopolies that command both powers. The stability of the various power holders is related to the nature of their power base; pure economic power is particularly unstable. However, economic power can be more readily amassed than interventionist power, which violates norms, and has a sharply declining marginal utility. When the effects of interventionist power are added to those of economic power, economies such as America, which are often classified as quite competitive, turn out to be much less so.

Type
Articles
Information
Journal of Public Policy , Volume 5 , Issue 2 , May 1985 , pp. 169 - 186
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1985

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