¹ U.S. Department of State, Proceedings and Documents of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1–22, 1944 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1946), I: 88Google Scholar. (Cited hereafter as Proceedings and Documents.) The United States now belongs to the World Bank Group [composed of the World Bank, the International Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance Corporation (IFC)], the Inter American Development Bank (IDB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the African Development Fund (AfDF).

² Proceedings and Documents, I: 984. On the intellectual origins of the movement to separate economics and politics in international relations, see Morse, Edward L., Modernization and the Transformation of International Relations (New York: Free Press, 1976), esp. chap. 3Google Scholar.

³ Proceedings and Documents, II: 1626.

⁴ IBRD Article IV, Section 10. Similar clauses are included in other MDB charters: IDA Article V, Section 6; IFC Article III, Section 9; IDB Article VIII, Section 5(f).

⁵ On this last point see Linehan, Patrick E., The Foreign Service Personnel System: An Organizational Analysis (Boulder, Col.: Westview, 1976), pp. 165, 168Google Scholar. On the general issue of the postwar separation of economic and political issues, see Spero, Joan Edelman, The Politics of International Economic Relations, 2d ed., (New York: St. Martin's, 1981), pp. 2–3Google Scholar.

⁶ Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard M. Nixon 1970 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1971), pp. 750–51Google Scholar.

⁷ In 1973 Bergsten, wrote that “every issue of international economics has at least an economic dimension and a political one, which in turn comprises both national and international politics. Development problems, which almost always encompass sociological and cultural considerations as well, are a particularly acute case in point. … Each specific issue has important political as well as economic content, on both the domestic and international levels. Such key ‘economic’ issues … are of course deeply rooted in internal politics, which are in turn based on sociological and even psychological factors as well as differing economic structures.” Bergsten, C. Fred, The Future of the International Economic Order: An Agenda for Research (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1973), pp. 9, 30–31Google Scholar.

⁸ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Related Agencies, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1978, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 1977, part 1, pp. 206, 459, 513–14Google Scholar.

⁹ Executive order number 11269, 14 February 1966.

¹⁰ When they cannot agree, the Secretary of the Treasury decides without a consensus. A dissenting principal can appeal directly to the President, but apparently this has occurred only rarely.

¹¹ OMDB was known briefly as the Office of International Development Banks.

¹² U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Related Agencies, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1979, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 1978, part 1, p. 429Google Scholar.

¹³ On the importance of control over the flow of information in bureaucratic decision making, see Madar, Daniel, “Patronage, Position, and Policy Planning: S/P and Secretary Kissinger,” Journal of Politics 42 (11 1980): 1070–71CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Pettigrew, Andrew, “Information Control as a Power Resource,” Sociology 6 (05 1972): 187–204CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bacchus, William, Foreign Policy and Bureaucratic Process: The State Department's Country Director System (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 191Google Scholar.

¹⁴ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, Treasury Department Management of U.S. Participation in the Inter-American Development Bank, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 1972, p. 13Google Scholar.

¹⁵ U.S. General Accounting Office, More Effective United States Participation Needed in World Bank and International Development Association, Report B-161470 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1973), p. 25Google Scholar; U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The United States and the Multilateral Development Banks, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 1974, p. 105Google Scholar; U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, Foreign Policy Implications of U.S. Participation in the Inter-American Development Bank, 91st Cong., 2dSess., 1970, p. 89Google Scholar.

¹⁶ See More Effective U.S. Participation Needed, pp. 29, 66–82.

¹⁷ The U.S. and the Multilateral Development Banks, pp. 106–7.

¹⁸ Washington Post, 29 December 1972, p. A2.

¹⁹ U.S. National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies, Annual Report 1972–73, pp. 57–59Google Scholar.

²⁰ See The U.S. and the Multilateral Development Banks, p. 109.

²¹ Foreign Assistance … Appropriations 1979, part 1, pp. 418, 431.

²² Senate Report 95–159, p. 13.

²³ The articles of agreement founding the IBRD grant bank officers nearly absolute immunity from any inquiry or legal process and also protect the bank's archives and communications from “search, requisition, confiscation, expropriation or any other form of seizure by executive or legislative action” (Article VII, Sections 4–9). In the United States, the Bretton Woods Agreements Act (PL79–171, Section 11) guarantees these immunities. See Sanford, Jonathan and Goodman, Margaret, “Congressional Oversight and the Multilateral Development Banks,” International Organization 29 (Autumn 1975): 1057–59CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁴ Foreign Assistance … Appropriations 1979, part 1, pp. 423–24; Foreign Policy Implications of U.S. Participation in the IDB, p. 9.

²⁵ Congressional Record, 18 July 1979, p. H6146.

²⁶ Earmarking is discussed below in a separate section.

²⁷ PL86–147, Section 21; PL86–565, Section 12.

²⁸ PL86–147, Section 22; PL86–565, Section 13.

²⁹ PL93–373, Section 3.

³⁰ PL95–118, Section 901(a). See also PL95–481, Section 609 and Foreign Assistance … Appropriations 1979, part 1, pp. 909–919.

³¹ PL95–118, Sections 701–704 (Title VII).

³² Mason, Edward S. and Asher, Robert E., The World Bank Since Bretton Woods (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1973), p. 171nGoogle Scholar.

³³ The IBRD's Third Annual Report, 1947–1948 (p. 14)Google Scholar reads: “The Bank is fully cognizant of the injunction in its Articles of Agreement that its decisions shall be based only on economic considerations. Political tensions and uncertainties in or among its member countries, however, have a direct effect on economic and financial conditions in those countries and upon their credit position.” Poland withdrew from the IBRD in 1950, and Czechoslovakia's suspension became a formal termination of membership in 1954.

³⁴ Mason, and Asher, , World Bank Since Bretton Woods, pp. 150–51, 370–71, 374Google Scholar.

³⁵ National Advisory Council, Annual Report 1972–73, p. 98Google Scholar.

³⁶ National Advisory Council, Annual Report 1977, pp. 124, 190Google Scholar.

³⁷ Apparently palms are extremely productive, combining longevity (3 years to maturity, then 30–35 years of full production) and high yield (two tons of oil per acre compared to 300 pounds of oil per acre for soybeans).

³⁸ In Malaysia, the largest producer, production expanded from 372,000 metric tons in 1970 to an estimated 2,325,000 metric tons in 1980.

³⁹ Congressional Record, 23 March 1976, p. 7583, and 20 July 1976, p. 22811; Senate Report 94–804.

⁴⁰ Congressional Record, 29 June 1976, pp. 21129–21135.

⁴¹ U.S. National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies, International Finance: Annual Report to the President and to the Congress for Fiscal Year 1978 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1980), p. 48Google Scholar.

⁴² U.S. National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies, International Finance: Annual Report to the President and to the Congress for Fiscal Year 1979 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1980), p. 48Google Scholar.

⁴³ National Advisory Council, International Finance 1978, p. 48Google Scholar.

⁴⁴ Foreign Policy Implications of U.S. Participation in the IDB, p. 13.

⁴⁵ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, New Directions for the 1970's—Part 2: Development Assistance Options for Latin America, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 1971, p. 95Google Scholar.

⁴⁶ For the IBRD and IDA: PL86–565, Section 12; for the IDB: PL86–147, Section 21.

⁴⁷ New Directions for the 1970's—Part 2, p. 102.

⁴⁸ For the view of a prominent liberal, see Fraser, Donald M., “Freedom and Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy no. 26 (Spring 1977), p. 153Google Scholar. For the Carter administration's continuation of previous administrations' policy on this issue, see National Advisory Council, Annual Report 1977, p. 89Google Scholar.

⁴⁹ Mason, and Asher, , World Bank Since Bretton Woods, p. 747Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ Powelson, John P., “International Lending Agencies,” in U.S. Foreign Policy and Peru, Sharp, Daniel A., ed. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1972), pp. 128, 149Google Scholar.

⁵¹ IBRD, The World Bank, International Development Association, and International Finance Corporation: Policies and Operations (Washington, D.C.: IBRD, 06 1969), p. 31Google Scholar.

⁵² Powelson, , “International Lending Agencies,” pp. 128, 149Google Scholar.

⁵³ IBRD, Operational policy memorandum 1.01, 31 March 1971, p. 3.

⁵⁴ New Directions for the 1970's—Part 2, pp. 44–45.

⁵⁵ U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees, Refugee and Humanitarian Problems in Chile, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 1973, p. 38Google Scholar.

⁵⁶ National Advisory Council, Annual Report 1977, p. 89Google Scholar.

⁵⁶ Powelson, , “International Lending Agencies,” pp. 149–50Google Scholar.

⁵⁸ PL93–373, Section 3.

⁵⁹ PL95–118, Section 702.

⁶⁰ U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance, IDB and AFDF Authorization, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 1976, p. 44Google Scholar.

⁶¹ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, Subcommittee on International Development Institutions and Finance, International Development Institutions—1977, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 1977, p. 82Google Scholar.

⁶² Congressional Record, 27 September 1976, p. 32592.

⁶³ International Development Institutions—1977, p. 9.

⁶⁴ Ibid., pp. 15, 64, 68, 73, 75.

⁶⁵ Ibid., pp. 80, 100.

⁶⁶ The letter is reprinted in Senate Report 95–159, p. 17.

⁶⁷ For details on the 97 of these votes cast through September 1980, see Schoultz, Lars, Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), pp. 296–98CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The 15 additional “no” votes and abstentions cast for human rights reasons between September 1980 and the end of the Carter administration in January 1981 follow.

⁶⁸ Washington Post, 9 July 1976, p. A2.

⁶⁹ Washington Post, 26 April 1978, p. A22.

⁷⁰ There are two explanations for the inability of the United States to halt loans that it opposed. One is simply the fact that, with the single exception of the IDB's Fund for Special Operations, the United States does not hold majority voting power in any MDB. Given this minority position, U.S. officials might have been expected to seek the support of other nations in the attempt to block loans to repressive governments. Since there is no evidence that such an effort was ever made, a second explanation seems at least plausible: the goal of the U.S. government was not to halt any particular loan but to communicate a message of concern to the MDBs and the recipient governments. In some cases (IDB loans to Pinochet's Chile, for example) the message appears to have had the effect of halting the processing of additional loans to repressive governments, but these cases are very few.

⁷¹ Article VII, Section 6.

⁷² Senate Report 94–39, p. 152.

⁷³ House Report 94–541, p. 17.

⁷⁴ Congressional Record, 3 August 1978, p. 24244.

⁷⁵ Senate Report 96–358, p. 35.

⁷⁶ Congressional Record, 9 October 1979, p. S14233.

⁷⁷ Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 3 November 1979, p. 2504.

⁷⁸ Congressional Record, 5 September 1979, p. H7294; Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 3 November 1979, p. 2504. In a retrospective analysis of McNamara's years at the World Bank, one of McNamara's closest associates noted that the letter was signed “in circumstances of maximum confusion and haste.” The incident apparently damaged McNamara's relations with the Bank's executive directors, who “joined unanimously to protest both the bypassing of the Board and the clear breach of the established practice that the President of the Bank dealt only with the executive authorities of member governments; to them McNamara's action underlined the determination of the United States to politicize the multilateral institutions. The episode really shook the confidence of the Board in their chairman's capacity to defend them against what they perceived as a hostile America.” Clark, William, “Robert McNamara at the World Bank,” Foreign Affairs 60 (Fall 1981), p. 181CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷⁹ For an understanding of the types of issues currently emphasized by realists, see Calleo, David P. and Rowland, Benjamin M., America and the World Political Economy: Atlantic Dreams and National Realities (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973)Google Scholar; Gilpin, Robert, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment (New York: Basic Books, 1975)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Krasner, Stephen D., Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978)Google Scholar. For a summary of the realist position, see Katzenstein, Peter J., “International Relations and Domestic Structures: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States,” International Organization 30 (Winter 1976), pp. 7–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gilpin, Robert, “Three Models of the Future,” International Organization 29 (Winter 1975): 37–60CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸⁰ Weissman, Steve, The Trojan Horse: A Radical Look at Foreign Aid (San Francisco: Ramparts Press, 1974)Google Scholar. See also Amin, Samir, “Development and Structural Change: African Experience,” in Ward, Barbara, d'Anjou, Lenore, and Runnalls, J. D., eds., The Widening Gap: Development in the 1970s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), pp. 312–33Google Scholar; Bodenheimer, Susanne, “Dependency and Imperialism,” in Fann, K. T. and Hodges, Donald C., eds., Readings in U.S. Imperialism (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1971), pp. 155–81Google Scholar; Goulet, Denis and Hudson, Michael, The Myth of Aid: The Hidden Agenda of the Development Reports (New York: International Documentation North America, 1971)Google Scholar; Hayter, Teresa, Aid as Imperialism (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971)Google Scholar; Hensman, C. R., Rich Against Poor: The Reality of Aid (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971)Google Scholar; Rothschild, Emma, “Food Politics,” Foreign Affairs 54 (01 1976): 285–308CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Spero, Joan Edelman, “Dominance-Dependence Relationships: The Case of France and Gabon,” Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1973Google Scholar.

⁸¹ On the general issue of domestic influences upon foreign policy, see Katzenstein, Peter J., “Introduction: Domestic and International Forces and Strategies of Foreign Economic Policy,” International Organization 31 (Autumn 1977): 587–606CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Katzenstein, , “International Relations and Domestic Structures,” esp. pp. 42–45Google Scholar; Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S. Jr, “International Interdependence and Integration,” in Greenstein, Fred I. and Polsby, Nelson W., eds., Handbook of Political Science, vol.8 (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), esp. pp. 392–93Google Scholar. For a series of specific empirical analyses of these domestic influences, see Bauer, Raymond A., Pool, Ithiel de Sola, and Dexter, Lewis Anthony, American Business and Public Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade (New York: Atherton Press, 1963)Google Scholar; Einhorn, Jessica P., Expropriation Politics (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1974)Google Scholar; Lipson, Charles H., “Corporate Preferences and Public Policies: Foreign Aid Sanctions and Investment Protection,” World Politics 28 (04 1976): 396–421CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Pastor, Robert A., “U.S. Sugar Politics and Latin America: Asymmetries in Input and Impact,” in Report of the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, vol. 3 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1975), appendix I, pp. 221–33Google Scholar; Schoultz, Lars, Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), esp. pp. 48–108CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸² Kenneth Waltz argued in 1967 that “it is impossible to disentangle the internal from the external forces that work upon policy.” But researchers can disentangle them without great difficulty whenever the overarching goal of national security is not available to subordinate other domestic interests. By 1975 Keohane and Nye could observe that “economic goals are, after all, to a considerable extent capable of being disaggregated and appropriated by particular individuals.” Waltz, Kenneth N., Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The American and British Experience (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), p. 307Google Scholar; Keohane, and Nye, , “International Interdependence and Integration,” p. 393Google Scholar.

⁸³ Katzenstein, , “International Relations and Domestic Structures,” p. 45Google Scholar.

⁸⁴ Congressional Record, 23 February 1978, p. 4453.