Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-t5pn6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-24T04:00:20.662Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Political Regimes and International Trade: The Democratic Difference Revisited

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 March 2004

XINYUAN DAI
XINYUAN DAI
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign, Urbana, IL 61801-3696 (xdai@uiuc.edu).
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

How do domestic political institutions affect the outcomes of international trade negotiations? Specifically, are the aggregate trade barriers agreed upon by a democratic pair lower than those by a pair composed of a democracy and an autocracy? I revisit these important questions by highlighting some problematic aspect of the analysis by Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff (2000). Contrary to their central conclusion, I find that whether the aggregate trade barriers are lower for a democratic pair than those for a mixed pair depends on the preferences of the decision makers involved. Thus, although domestic political institutions are important, they alone are insufficient to predict a higher level of cooperation among democracies.

Type
FORUM
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 96 , Issue 1 , March 2002 , pp. 159 - 165
Copyright
© 2002 by the American Political Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Alvarez Jose E. 2001 Do Liberal States Behave Better? A Critique of Slaughter's Liberal Theory European Journal of International Law 12 2 183 247Google Scholar
Busch Marc L. 2000 Democracy, Consultation and the Paneling of Disputes under GATT Journal of Conflict Resolution 44 August 425 46Google Scholar
Gowa Joanne 1999 Ballots and Bullets: The Elusive Democratic Peace Princeton, NJ Princeton University Press
Mansfield Edward D. Milner Helen V. Rosendorff B. Peter 2000 Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade American Political Science Review 94 June 305 21Google Scholar
Morrow James D. Siverson Randolph M. Tabares Tressa E. 1998 The Political Determinants of International Trade: The Major Powers, 1907–1990 American Political Science Review 92 September 649 61Google Scholar
Putnam Robert 1988 Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games International Organization 42 Summer 427 60Google Scholar
Raustiala Kal Victor David G. 1998 Conclusions The Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments: Theory and Practice David G. Victor Kal Raustiala Eugene Skolnikoff Cambridge, MA MIT Press, 659–707
Reinhardt Eric 2000 Aggressive Multilateralism: The Determinants of GATT/WTO Dispute Initiation, 1948–1998. Emory University. Typescript
Simmons Beth 2000 International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs American Political Science Review 94 December 819 35Google Scholar
Slaughter Anne-Marie 1995 International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda European Journal of International Law 12 2 205 39Google Scholar