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  1. Home
  2. Books
  3. Donald Davidson
  • Cited by 14
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Online publication date:
December 2009
Print publication year:
2003
Online ISBN:
9780511610189
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511610189
Subjects:
History of Philosophy, Twentieth-Century Philosophy, Philosophy
Series:
Contemporary Philosophy in Focus
Information

Book description

Donald Davidson has been one of the most influential figures in modern analytic philosophy and has made seminal contributions in a wide range of subjects: philosophy of language, philosophy of action, philosophy of mind, epistemology, metaphysics and the theory of rationality. His principal work, embodied in a series of landmark essays stretching over nearly forty years, exhibits a unity rare among philosophers contributing on so many diverse fronts. Written by a distinguished team of philosophers, this volume includes chapters on truth and meaning, the philosophy of action, radical interpretation, philosophical psychology, knowledge of the external world, other minds and our own minds, and the implications of Davidson's work for literary theory. This book is a comprehensive introduction to the full range of Davidson's work, and as such it will be of particular value to advanced undergraduates, graduates and professionals in philosophy, psychology, linguistics, and literary theory.

Reviews

'… the essays provide a good introduction to selected topics in Davidson's philosophy. The chapters present his arguments in an accessible fashion and place them in philosophical and historical context, often providing a concise introduction to the particular sub-field in the process. They not only point out developments in Davidson's approach, but difficulties, as well. Most of the essays go beyond the reconstruction of Davidson's specific views to develop the author's own position with reference to the contemporary debate. One of the strengths of the volume is that it places Davidson's views in the context of on-going philosophical debates and supplies references for in depth study. … the volume represents a valuable and systematic contribution to contemporary scholarship on Davidson's philosophy.'

Source: Protosociology

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Contents

Contents
References
Bibliography of Davidson's Publications
Bibliographic References
Bibliography of Davidson's publications
Davidson's collected papers
1980. Essays on Actions and Events. New York: Clarendon Press. Second edition published in 2001. The second edition adds two appendices, “Adverbs of Actions” and “Reply to Quine on Events.”
1984. Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. New York: Clarendon Press. Second edition published in 2001. The second edition adds an appendix, “Replies to Lewis and Quine,” to Chapter 10, “Belief and the Basis of Meaning.”
2001. Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective. New York: Clarendon Press
Forthcoming. Volume 4, Problems of Rationality. New York: Clarendon Press
Forthcoming. Volume 5, Truth, Language and History. New York: Clarendon Press
Articles
1952. Why Study Philosophy?View Point, 2, 22–4
1955. Outline of a Formal Theory of Value. Philosophy of Science, 22, 140–60. (With J. J. C. McKinsey and Patrick Suppes.)
1955. The Return of Reason in Ethics. In T. Kimura (Ed.), Analysis of the American Way of Thinking. Tokyo: Tokyo University Press. (In Japanese.)
1956. A Finitistic Axiomatization of Subjective Probability and Utility. Econometrica, 24, 264–75. (With Patrick Suppes.)
1959. Experimental Tests of a Stochastic Decision Theory. In C. W. Churchman and P. Ratoosh (Eds.), Measurement: Definitions and Theories (pp. 233–69). New York: Wiley and Sons. (With J. Marschak.)
1963. 1Actions, Reasons, and Causes. The Journal of Philosophy, 60, 685–99
1963. The Method of Intension and Extension. In A. Schilpp (Ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap (pp. 311–49). La Salle, Ill.: Open Court
1966. 1Emeroses by Other Names. The Journal of Philosophy, 63, 778–9
1966.2 Theories of Meaning and Learnable Languages. In Y. Bar-Hillel (Ed.), Proceedings of the 1964 International Congress for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science (pp. 383–94). Amsterdam: North Holland
1967. 1Causal Relations. The Journal of Philosophy, 64, 691–703
1967.1 The Logical Form of Action Sentences. In N. Rescher (Ed.), The Logic of Decision and Action (pp. 81–95). Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press
1967. 2Truth and Meaning. Synthese, 17, 304–23
1968. 2On Saying That. Synthese, 19, 130–46
1969. Facts and Events. In J. Margolis (Ed.), Fact and Existence (pp. 74–84). Oxford: Blackwell
1969.1 The Individuation of Events. In N. Rescher (Ed.), Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel (pp. 216–34). Dordrecht: D. Reidel
1969. 2True to the Facts. The Journal of Philosophy, 66, 748–64
1970. Action and Reaction. Inquiry, 13, 140–8
1970. 1Events as Particulars. Nous, 4, 25–32
1970.1 How Is Weakness of the Will Possible? In J. Feinberg (Ed.), Moral Concepts (pp. 93–113). Oxford: Oxford University Press
1970.1 Mental Events. In L. Foster and J. Swanson (Eds.), Experience and Theory (pp. 79–102). Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press
1970.2 Semantics for Natural Languages. In Linguaggi nella Societa e nella Tecnica. Milan: Comunita
1971.1 Agency. In R. Binkley, R. Bronaugh, and A. Marras (Eds.), Agent, Action, and Reason (pp. 3–37). Toronto: University of Toronto Press
1971. 1Eternal vs. Ephemeral Events. Nous, 5, 335–49
1973.1 Freedom to Act. In T. Honderich (Ed.), Essays On Freedom of Action (pp. 137–56). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul
1973.2 In Defence of Convention T. In H. Leblanc (Ed.), Truth, Syntax and Modality (pp. 76–86). Dordretch: North-Holland
1973.1 The Material Mind. Paper presented at the Fourth International Congress for Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, Dordrecht, Holland
1973. 2Radical Interpretation. Dialectica, 27, 314–28
1974. 2Belief and the Basis of Meaning. Synthese, 27, 309–23
1974. 2On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 47, 5–20
1974.1 Psychology as Philosophy. In S. C. Brown (Ed.), Philosophy of Psychology (pp. 41–52). London: Macmillan
1974. 2Replies to David Lewis and W. V. Quine. Synthese, 27, 345–9
1975.2 Thought and Talk. In S. Guttenplan (Ed.), Mind and Language (pp. 7–23). Oxford: Oxford University Press
1976. 1Hempel on Explaining Action. Erkenntnis, 10, 239–53
1976. 1Hume's Cognitive Theory of Pride. The Journal of Philosophy, 73, 744–56
1976.2 Reply to Foster. In G. Evans and J. McDowell (Eds.), Truth and Meaning: Essays in Semantics (pp. 33–41). Oxford: Oxford University Press
1977. 2The Method of Truth in Metaphysics. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 2, 244–54
1977. 2Reality without Reference. Dialectica, 31, 247–53
1978.1 Intending. In Y. Yovel (Ed.), Philosophy of History and Action (pp. 41–60). Dordretch: D. Reidel and The Magnes Press
1978. 2What Metaphors Mean. Critical Inquiry, 5, 31–47
1979. 2The Inscrutability of Reference. The Southwest Journal of Philosophy, 10, 7–20
1979.2 Moods and Performances. In A. Margalit (Ed.), Meaning and Use (pp. 9–20). Dordrecht: D. Reidel
1979. 2Quotation. Theory and Decision, 11, 27–40
1980.1 Comments and Replies. In Essays on Actions and Events (pp. 239–44). New York: Clarendon Press
1980. 5Toward a Unified Theory of Meaning and Action. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 11, 1–12
1982. 3Empirical Content. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 17, 471–89
1982.4 Paradoxes of Irrationality. In R. Wollheim et al. (Eds.), Philosophical Essays on Freud (pp. 289–305). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
1982. 3Rational Animals. Dialectica, 36, 317–28
1983.3 A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge. In D. Henrich (Ed.), Kant oder Hegel? (pp. 423–38). Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta
1983. 2Communication and Convention. The Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1, 13–25. Published in 1984 in Synthese, 59, 3–18
1984.4Expressing Evaluations. Lawrence, Kan.: Lindley
1984. 3First Person Authority. Dialectica, 38, 101–12
1985.1 Adverbs of Action. In B. Vermazen (Ed.), Essays on Davidson (pp. 230–41). Oxford: Clarendon Press
1985.4 Deception and Division. In E. Lepore (Ed.), Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson (pp. 138–48). Oxford: Blackwell. Also published in 1986 in J. Elster (Ed.), The Multiple Self (pp. 79–92). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
1985. 4Incoherence and Irrationality. Dialectica, 39, 345–54
1985. A New Basis for Decision Theory. Theory and Decision, 18, 87–98
1985.1 Reply to Quine on Events. In E. Lepore (Ed.), Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson (pp. 172–6). Oxford: Blackwell
1986.4 Judging Interpersonal Interests. In J. Elster and A. Hylland (Eds.), Foundations of Social Choice Theory (pp. 195–211). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
1986.5 A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs. In E. Lepore (Ed.), Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Blackwell. Also published in 1986 in R. E. Grandy (Ed.), Philosophical Grounds of Rationality (pp. 157–74). Oxford: Oxford University Press
1987.3 Afterthoughts, 1987. In A. Malichowski (Ed.), Reading Rorty (pp. 120–38). Cambridge: Blackwell
1987. 3Knowing One's Own Mind. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 60(3), 441–58
1987.4 Problems in the Explanation of Action. In P. Pettit (Ed.), Metaphysics and Morality: Essays in Honour of J. J. C. Smart (pp. 35–49). New York: Blackwell
1988.3 Epistemology and Truth. Proceedings of the Fourth Panamerican Philosophy Conference, Cordoba, Argentina
1988. Reply to Burge. The Journal of Philosophy, 85, 664–5
1989. The Conditions of Thought. In J. Brandl and W. L. Gombocz (Eds.), The Mind of Donald Davidson (pp. 193–200). Amsterdam: Rodopi
1989.3 The Myth of the Subjective. In M. Krausz (Ed.), Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation (pp. 159–72). Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press
1989.3 What Is Present to the Mind? In J. Brandl and W. Gombocz (Eds.), The Mind of Donald Davidson (pp. 3–18). Amsterdam: Rodopi
1990.5 Meaning, Truth and Evidence. In R. Barret and R. F. Gibson (Eds.), Perspectives on Quine (pp. 68–79). Cambridge: Blackwell
1990.4 Representation and Interpretation. In W. H. Newton-Smith and K. V. Wilkes (Eds.), Modelling the Mind (pp. 12–26). Oxford: Oxford University Press
1990. The Structure and Content of Truth. The Journal of Philosophy, 87(6), 279–328
1990.4 Turing's Test. In W. H. Newton-Smith and K. V. Wilkes (Eds.), Modelling the Mind (pp. 1–11). Oxford: Oxford University Press
1991. 3Epistemology Externalized. Dialectica, 45(2–3), 191–202
1991. 5James Joyce and Humpty Dumpty. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 16, 1–12
1991.3 Three Varieties of Knowledge. Philosophy, 30(supp.), 153–66. Also published in 1991 in A. P. Griffiths (Ed.), A. J. Ayer: Memorial Essays (pp. 153–66). New York: Cambridge University Press
1991.3 What Is Present to the Mind. In E. Villanueva (Ed.), Consciousness (Vol. 6) (pp. 97–214). Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview
1992. 3The Second Person. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 17, 255–67
1992.5 The Socratic Conception of Truth. In K. J. Boudouris (Ed.), The Philosophy of Socrates: Elenchus, Ethics and Truth (pp. 51–8). Athens: International Center for Greek Philosophy and Culture
1993.5 Locating Literary Language. In R. W. Dasenbrock (Ed.), Literary Theory after Davidson (pp. 295–308). University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press
1993. 5Method and Metaphysics. Deucalion, 11, 239–48
1993.5 Plato's Philosopher. In R. W. Sharples (Ed.), Modern Thinkers and Ancient Thinkers (pp. 1–15). Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press. Also published in 1993 in Apeiron, 26(3–4), 179–94
1993. Reply to Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore's ‘Is Radical Interpretation Possible?’ In R. Stoecker (Ed.), Reflecting Davidson (pp. 77–84). New York: de Gruyter
1993. Thinking Causes. In J. Heil and A. Mele (Eds.), Mental Causation (pp. 3–17). New York: Clarendon Press
1993. 5The Third Man. Critical Inquiry, 19(4), 607–16
1994.5 Dialectic and Dialogue. In G. Preyer (Ed.), Language, Mind, and Epistemology: On Donald Davidson's Philosophy (pp. 429–37). Dordrecht: Kluwer
1994. Donald Davidson. In S. Guttenplan (Ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind (pp. 231–6). Oxford: Blackwell
1994. Exchange between Donald Davidson and W. V. Quine following Davidson's Lecture. Theoria, 60(3), 226–31
1994. On Quine's Philosophy. Theoria, 60(3), 184–92
1994. Radical Interpretation Interpreted. In J. Tomberlin (Ed.), Philosophical Perspectives: Logic and Language (Vol. 8) (pp. 121–28). Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview
1994.5 The Social Aspect of Language. In B. McGuinness (Ed.), The Philosophy of Michael Dummett (pp. 1–16). Dordrecht: Kluwer
1994. 5What Is Quine's View of Truth?Inquiry, 37(4), 437–40
1995. 4Could There Be a Science of Rationality?International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 3(1), 1–16
1995. Laws and Cause. Dialectica, 49(2–4), 263–79
1995.4 The Objectivity of Values. In C. Gutiérrez (Ed.), El Trabajo Filosófico de Hoy en el Continente (pp. 59–69). Bogatá: Editorial ABC
1995. 4The Problem of Objectivity. Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, 57(2), 203–20
1995.5 Pursuit of the Concept of Truth. In P. Leonardi and M. Santambrogio (Eds.), On Quine: New Essays (pp. 7–21). New York: Cambridge University Press
1996. 5The Folly of Trying to Define Truth. The Journal of Philosophy, 93, 263–78
1996.3 Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective. In P. Coates and D. Ituito (Eds.), Current Issues in Idealism (pp. 155–76). Bristol: Thoemmes
1997. The Centrality of Truth. In J. Peregrin (Ed.), The Nature of Truth: Proceedings of the International Colloquium (pp. 3–14). Prague: Filosofia
1997.5 Gadamer and Plato's Philebus. In L. Hahn (Ed.), The Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer (pp. 421–32). Chicago: Open Court
1997.3 Indeterminism and Antirealism. In C. B. Kulp (Ed.), Realism/Antirealism and Epistemology (pp. 109–22). Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield
1997.5 Seeing through Language. In J. Preston (Ed.), Thought and Language (pp. 15–28). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
1997.4 Who Is Fooled? In J.-P. Dupuy (Ed.), Self-Deception and Paradoxes of Rationality (pp. 1–18). Stanford: CSLI Publications
1998.3 The Irreducibility of the Concept of the Self. In M. Stamm (Ed.), Philosophie in Synthetisher Absicht (pp. 123–30). Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta
1998.5 Replies. Crítica, 30, 97–112. Replies to articles by Barry Stroud, John McDowell, Richard Rorty, and Carlos Pereda in Crítica, 28 (1998)
1999. 3The Emergence of Thought. Erkenntnis, 51(1), 7–17
1999. Intellectual Autobiography. In L. E. Hahn (Ed.), The Philosophy of Donald Davidson (pp. 3–70). Chicago: Open Court
1999. Interpretation: Hard in Theory, Easy in Practice. In M. D. Caro (Ed.), Interpretations and Causes: New Perspectives on Donald Davidson's Philosophy (pp. 31–44). Dordrecht: Kluwer
1999. Spinoza's Causal Theory of the Affects. In Y. Yovel (Ed.), Desire and Affect: Spinoza as Psychologist (pp. 95–112). New York: Little Room Press
1999. Is Truth a Goal of Inquiry? Discussion with Rorty. In U. M. Zeglen (Ed.), Donald Davidson: Truth, Meaning and Knowledge (pp. 17–19). London: Routledge
2000.4 Objectivity and Practical Reason. In E. Ullmann-Margalit (Ed.), Reasoning Practically (pp. 17–26). Oxford: Oxford University Press
2000. Perils and Pleasures of Interpretation. Ars Interpretandi, 5, 21–37
2000.5 Truth Rehabilitated. In R. B. Brandom (Ed.), Rorty and His Critics (pp. 65–74). Cambridge: Blackwell
2001. Externalisms. In P. Kotatko, P. Pagin, and G. Segal (Eds.), Interpreting Davidson (pp. 1–16). Stanford: CSLI Publications
Books
1957. Decision Making: An Experimental Approach. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. (With Patrick Suppes.)
1990. Plato's Philebus. New York: Garland. (1949 Harvard dissertation.)
Edited books
1969. Words and Objections: Essays on the Work of W. V. Quine. Dordrecht: Reidel. (With Jaakko Hintikka.) Rev. ed. 1975. (With Jaakko Hintikka and W. V. Quine.)
1970. Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. (With Carl Hempel and Nicholas Rescher.)
1972. Semantics of Natural Language. Boston: D. Reidel. (With Gilbert Harman.) A second edition was published in 1977 with additional essays by Saul Kripke and others
1975. The Logic of Grammar. Encino, Calif.: Dickenson. (With Gilbert Harman.)
Videotaped conversations
1997. In Conversation: Donald Davidson (19 videocassettes, 1460 min.). Introduced and edited by R. Fara. London: Philosophy International Centre for Philosophy of the Natural and Social Sciences, London School of Economics
Bibliographic References
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1957) Intention. Oxford: Blackwell
Antony, L. (1989) Anomalous Monism and the Problem of Explanatory Force. The Philosophical Review 98, 153–87
Antony, L. M. (1994) The Inadequacy of Anomalous Monism as a Realist Theory of Mind. In G. Preyer (Ed.), Language, Mind, and Epistemology: On Donald Davidson's Philosophy (pp. 223–54). Dordrecht: Kluwer
Armstrong, D. M., and Malcolm, N. (1984) Consciousness and Causality: A Debate on the Nature of Mind. New York: Blackwell
Audi, R. (1993) Action, Intention, and Reason. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press
Barthes, R. (1967) Elements of Semiology. London: Cape
Barwise, J. (1981) Scenes and Other Situations. The Journal of Philosophy, 78, 369–97
Barwise, J., and Perry, J. (1981a) Semantic Innocence and Uncompromising Situations. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 6, 387–403
Barwise, J., and Perry, J. (1981b) Situations and Attitudes. The Journal of Philosophy, 78, 668–90
Barwise, J., and Perry, J. (1983) Situations and Attitudes. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
Beaney, M. (Ed.) (1997) The Frege Reader. Oxford: Blackwell
Bergstrom, L. (1994) Interview with Donald Davidson. Theoria, 60, 207–25
Bishop, J. (1989) Natural Agency. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Block, N., and Stalnaker, R. (1999) Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap. Philosophical Review, 108(1, 1–46
Bolker, E. (1967) A Simultaneous Axiomatization of Utility and Subjective Probability. Philosophy of Science, 34, 330–40
Boolos, G. (1984) To Be Is to Be a Value of a Variable (or to Be Some Values of Some Variables). The Journal of Philosophy, 81, 430–49
Boolos, G. (1985) Nominalist Platonism. Philosophical Review, 94, 327–44
Borges, J. (1965) Pierre Menard: Author of the Quixote. In Fictions (pp. 42–51). London: John Calder
Brand, M. (1984) Intending and Acting. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
Bratman, M. (1985) Davidson's Theory of Intention. In E. Lepore (Ed.), Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson (pp. 14–28). Oxford: Blackwell
Bratman, M. (1987) Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press
Bratman, M. (1999) Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency. New York: Cambridge University Press
Brooks, C. (1947) What Does Poetry Communicate? In The Well Wrought Urn: Studies in the Structure of Poetry. New York: Reynal and Hitchcock
Burge, T. (1993) Mind-Body Causation and Explanatory Practice. In J. Heil and A. R. Mele (Eds.), Mental Causation. New York: Clarendon
Burge, T. (1999) Comprehension and Interpretation. In L. E. Hahn (Ed.), The Philosophy of Donald Davidson (pp. 229–50). Chicago: Open Court
Cappelen, H., and Lepore, E. (1997) Varieties of Quotation. Mind, 106(423), 429–50
Cappelen, H., and Lepore, E. (1999a) Semantics for Quotation. In K. Murasugi (Ed.), Philosophy and Linguistics (pp. 209–21). Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press
Cappelen, H., and Lepore, E. (1999b) Replies to the Commentaries. In K. Murasugi (Ed.), Philosophy and Linguistics (pp. 279–85). Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press
Carlson, G. (1984) Thematic Roles and Their Role in Semantic Interpretation. Linguistics, 22, 259–79
Castañeda, H. (1967) Comments. In N. Rescher (Ed.), The Logic of Decision and Action. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press
Chihara, C. S. (1976) Truth, Meaning, and Paradox. Nous, 10, 305–12
Child, W. (1993) Anomalism, Uncodifiability, and Psychophysical Relations. Philosophical Review, 102, 215–45
Child, W. (1994) Causality, Interpretation, and the Mind. New York: Clarendon Press
Chomsky, N. (1995) Language and Nature. Mind, 104, 1–61
Church, A. (1943) Carnap's Introduction to Semantics. Philosophical Review, 52, 298–305
Church, A. (1951) The Need for Abstract Entities in Semantic Analysis. Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Letters, 80, 100–12
Church, A. (1956) Introduction to Mathematical Logic. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press
Costa, M. (1987) Causal Theories of Action. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 17, 831–54
Dasenbrock, R. W. (1993) Literary Theory after Davidson. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press
Davidson, D. (1963) The Method of Intension and Extension. In A. Schilpp (Ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap (pp. 311–50). La Salle, Ill.: Open Court
Davidson, D. (1970) Action and Reaction. Inquiry, 13, 140–8
Davidson, D. (1980a) Essays on Actions and Events. New York: Clarendon Press
Davidson, D. (1980b) Toward a Unified Theory of Meaning and Action. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 11, 1–12
Davidson, D. (1980 [1963]) Actions, Reasons, and Causes. In Essays on Actions and Events (pp. 3–20). New York: Clarendon Press. Original publication (1963): The Journal of Philosophy, 60, 685–99
Davidson, D. (1980a [1967]) Causal Relations. In Essays on Actions and Events (pp. 149–62). New York: Clarendon Press. Original publication (1967): The Journal of Philosophy, 64, 691–703
Davidson, D. (1980b [1967]) The Logical Form of Action Sentences. In Essays on Actions and Events (pp. 105–21). New York: Clarendon Press. Original publication (1967): In N. Rescher (Ed.), The Logic of Decision and Action. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press
Davidson, D. (1980 [1969]) The Individuation of Events. In Essays on Actions and Events (pp. 163–80). New York: Clarendon Press. Original publication (1969): In N. Rescher (Ed.), Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel (pp. 216–34). Dordrecht: D. Reidel
Davidson, D. (1980a [1970]) Events as Particulars. In Essays on Actions and Events (pp. 181–8). New York: Clarendon Press. Original publication (1970): Nous, 4, 25–32
Davidson, D. (1980b [1970]) How Is Weakness of the Will Possible? In Essays on Actions and Events (pp. 21–42). New York: Clarendon Press. Original publication (1970): In J. Feinberg (Ed.), Moral Concepts. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Davidson, D. (1980c [1970]) Mental Events. In Essays on Actions and Events (pp. 207–24). New York: Clarendon Press. Original publication (1970): In L. Foster and J. Swanson (Eds.), Experience and Theory. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press
Davidson, D. (1980a [1971]) Agency. In Essays on Actions and Events (pp. 43–62). New York: Clarendon Press. Original publication (1971): In R. Binkley, R. Bronaugh, and A. Marras (Eds.), Agent, Action, and Reason (pp. 3–37). Toronto: University of Toronto Press
Davidson, D. (1980b [1971]) Eternal vs. Ephemeral Events. In Essays on Actions and Events (pp. 189–204). New York: Clarendon Press. Original publication (1971): Nous, 5, 335–349
Davidson, D. (1980a [1973]) Freedom to Act. In Essays on Actions and Events (pp. 63–82). New York: Clarendon Press. Original publication (1973): In T. Honderich (Ed.), Essays On Freedom of Action. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul
Davidson, D. (1980b [1973]) The Material Mind. In Essays on Actions and Events (pp. 245–60). New York: Clarendon Press. Original publication (1973): In P. Suppes, L. Henkin, and G. C. Moisil (Eds.), Proceedings of the Fourth International Congress for Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science. Dordrecht: D. Reidel
Davidson, D. (1980 [1974]) Psychology as Philosophy. In Essays on Actions and Events (pp. 229–38). New York: Clarendon Press. Original publication (1974): In S. C. Brown (Ed.), Philosophy of Psychology. London: Macmillan
Davidson, D. (1980a [1976]) Hempel on Explaining Action. In Essays on Actions and Events (pp. 261–76). New York: Clarendon Press. Original publication (1976): Erkenntnis, 10, 239–53
Davidson, D. (1980b [1976]) Hume's Cognitive Theory of Pride. In Essays on Actions and Events (pp. 277–90). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Original publication (1976): The Journal of Philosophy, 73, 744–56
Davidson, D. (1980 [1978]) Intending. In Essays on Actions and Events (pp. 83–102). New York: Clarendon Press. Original publication (1978): In Y. Yovel (Ed.), Philosophy of History and Action. Dordretch: D. Reidel and The Magnes Press
Davidson, D. (1982) Paradoxes of Irrationality. In R. Wollheim et al. (Eds.), Philosophical Essays on Freud (pp. 289–305). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Davidson, D. (1984a) Expressing Evaluations. Lawrence, Kan.: Lindley
Davidson, D. (1984b) Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. New York: Clarendon Press
Davidson, D. (1984 [1966]) Theories of Meaning and Learnable Languages. In Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (pp. 3–16). New York: Clarendon Press. Original publication (1966): In Y. Bar-Hillel (Ed.), Proceedings of the 1964 International Congress for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science. Amsterdam: North Holland
Davidson, D. (1984 [1967]) Truth and Meaning. In Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (pp. 17–36). New York: Clarendon Press. Original publication (1967): Synthese, 17, 304–23
Davidson, D. (1984 [1968]) On Saying That. In Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (pp. 93–108). New York: Clarendon Press. Original publication (1968): Synthese, 19, 130–46
Davidson, D. (1984 [1969]) True to the Facts. In Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (pp. 37–54). New York: Clarendon Press. Original publication (1969): The Journal of Philosophy, 66, 748–64
Davidson, D. (1984 [1970]) Semantics for Natural Languages. In Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (pp. 37–54). New York: Clarendon Press. Original publication (1970): In Linguaggi nella Societa e nella Tecnica. Milan: Comunita
Davidson, D. (1984a [1973]) In Defense of Convention T. In Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (pp. 65–76). New York: Clarendon Press. Original publication (1973): In H. Leblanc (Ed.), Truth, Syntax and Modality. Dordretch: North-Holland
Davidson, D. (1984b [1973]) Radical Interpretation. In Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (pp. 125–40). New York: Clarendon Press. Original publication (1973): Dialectica, 27, 314–28
Davidson, D. (1984a [1974]) Belief and the Basis of Meaning. In Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (pp. 141–54). New York: Clarendon Press. Original publication (1974): Synthese, 27, 309–23
Davidson, D. (1984b [1974]) On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme. In Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (pp. 183–98). New York: Clarendon Press. Original publication (1974): Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 47, 5–20
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