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Theoretical Computer Science
Volume 340, Issue 1, 13 June 2005, Pages 82-101
Theoretical Foundations of Security Analysis and Design II
 
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doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2005.03.004    How to Cite or Link Using DOI (Opens New Window)
Copyright © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Using data-independence in the analysis of intrusion detection systems

Gordon Thomas RohrmairE-mail The Corresponding Author and Gavin LoweCorresponding Author Contact Information, E-mail The Corresponding Author

Oxford University Computing Laboratory, Wolfson Building, Parks Road, Oxford OX1 3QD, UK

Available online 19 March 2005.

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Abstract

In this paper we demonstrate the modelling and analysis of intrusion detection systems and their environment using the process algebra Communicating Sequential Processes and its model checker FDR. We show that this analysis can be used to discover attack strategies that can be used to blind an intrusion detection system, even a hypothetically perfect one that knows all the weaknesses of its protected host. We give an exhaustive analysis of all such attack possibilities. We discuss how to strengthen the intrusion detection systems to prevent these attacks, and finally we show how we can use data independence techniques to verify the corrected versions.

Keywords: Intrusion detection; Desynchronisation attacks; Communicating Sequential Processes; Model checking; Data independence


Theoretical Computer Science
Volume 340, Issue 1, 13 June 2005, Pages 82-101
Theoretical Foundations of Security Analysis and Design II
 
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