Elsevier

Safety Science

Volume 110, Part C, December 2018, Pages 59-68
Safety Science

Changes in Norway’s societal safety and security measures following the 2011 Oslo terror attacks

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2017.06.014Get rights and content

Highlights

  • A number of actions are subsequently implemented after large-scale events for different reasons.

  • An interplay of various factors influences the changes in the area of societal safety and security.

  • Sectorial responsibility hinders cooperation between sectors.

Abstract

This paper characterizes changes in Norway’s civil protection and emergency preparedness five years after the Oslo and Utøya terror attacks. Data from 48 interviews conducted in the period 2014–2016 with civil servants within different levels of the justice sector were qualitatively analyzed. The inductive analysis shows four main changes made related to Norway’s civil protection and emergency preparedness within the Ministry of Justice and Public Security: (1) a change in risk perception regarding awareness of security-related risks; (2) the generation of several plans and measures; (3) structural changes at various levels within the justice sector; and (4) increased resources allocated to societal safety and security. The changes following the Oslo terror attacks were not solely in response to the terror attacks, but also the result of previous and subsequent events and reports. The current organization of public administration, however, still fosters siloed thinking and turf wars around the principle of responsibility and each sector’s respective area of expertise. Most of the implemented changes can be characterized as structural; diagnoses made after the terror attacks pointed at cultural aspects.

Introduction

In the post-war era, Norway has been fortunate in facing only a handful of large-scale crises and terror-related events (Rykkja et al., 2011). As a result, a fairly untroubled society has been able to attend primarily to the welfare of its inhabitants (Kuhnle, 2000, Wollebæk et al., 2012). On July 22, 2011, the nation was shocked when an armed right-wing extremist single-handedly bombed the Government Complex in Oslo and thereafter shot young political aspirants attending a youth camp on the island of Utøya. In total, 77 people were killed during these terror attacks.

The aftermath of disasters and national crises represent an opportune time to examine governmental strategies for civil protection and emergency preparedness (Birkmann et al., 2010). They provide a moment for self-reflection and a chance to learn from previous mistakes and weaknesses in the governmental system. Changes are usually implemented to demonstrate handling capacity or rectify specific gaps in the system (March and Olsen, 1983). Lessons learned are ideally applied to a broad context, where the knowledge gained is used to address not only the specific problem but also other issues that may arise from these inadequacies.

Nevertheless, in these situations, society also often shows an inclination toward morality plays and blame games (Boin et al., 2006). A focusing event, such as a terror attack, often leads to excessive fixation on solving the specific problem brought to light by the event (Birkland, 2006). Leaders feel pressured to take charge and prevent a similar crisis, and they risk overreacting by way of regulation or other actions and measures in response to the event (de Ridder and Reinders, 2014, van Tol, 2016). This spontaneous reaction is in part due to media coverage or “mediazation” (Helsloot et al., 2012), political interests, misconceptions, and an overestimation of risks (de Ridder and Reinders, 2014). Unfortunately, increasing focus on an event does not guarantee that learning will occur (Birkland, 2006).

Competition in politics influence how resources are distributed, even in affluent countries like Norway (Ölcer, 2010). Political mechanisms operate and create opportunities for some interest groups to benefit more than others (Ibid). The ability to determine the allocation of resources reflects power of individuals and groups (Lukes 1974, in Antonsen, 2009). When large-scale crises transpire, the government faces pressure to act and appease the public in order to restore citizens’ confidence in the country’s leaders. The political pressure coming from the media and the general public is, however, fleeting. This causes an intense political focus to shift from one issue to another, or a loss of momentum during change processes (Bodensteiner, 1995, Walgrave and Van Aelst, 2006).

Organizational structures also affect the resources available for civil protection and emergency preparedness. By way of example, a rush and backlash of organizational changes related to the imbalanced focus on terrorism followed 9/11 in the US where the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was placed under the Department of Homeland Security, resulting in the weakening of FEMA’s emergency network, political influence, critical staff members, key functions, and resources (Moynihan, 2009). The disproportional focus on national security resulted in the poor response to Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans (Moynihan, 2009).

In brief, the changes that occur in public organizations following a crisis are not straightforward, as these organizations are part of a “complex political and social network of organized interests, citizens, user groups, and clients” (Christensen et al., 2007). Many factors influence and oppose each other, producing varied results regarding legal frameworks, negotiations, conflicting goals, finite resources, external pressures, and culture.

It is not surprising then that in an age dominated by highly complex and tightly coupled socio-technical systems (Perrow, 1984, Rasmussen, 1997), research on policy changes following crises and mega-crises has attracted a great deal of interest (Helsloot et al., 2012, t’Hart, 2013). The first point is so obvious it might be missed by way of its central importance; previous research makes it quite clear that governmental policy changes after large-scale events, such as Hurricane Katrina (Olshansky, 2006, Birkland and Lawrence, 2009, Boin et al., 2009, Moynihan, 2009), Fukushima (Wittneben, 2012, Samuels, 2013), Hurricane Andrew (Twigg, 2012), the 9/11 terror attacks (Birkland, 2006, Boin et al., 2009), and the Columbine shootings (Birkland and Lawrence, 2009). The research for this paper explores whether the Oslo terror attacks brought about drastic changes in Norway’s societal safety and security. The paper seeks to answer two main questions. First, what changes to Norway’s societal safety and security measures were implemented in the aftermath of the 2011 Oslo terror attacks? Second, what factors explain the developments in Norway’s emergency preparedness?

The study has been undertaken as part of the research project NEXUS (The Next Disaster – cooperation and action capacity in Norway after the 22nd of July terror attacks). As the effects of change, and especially changes in culture, take time before they can be observed, this paper does not evaluate the effects of wider secular trends. Rather, we aim to explore some changes, e.g. the structural reorganization within the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (MJ) and describe the various factors that have influenced the developments in societal safety and security, both from a specific instrumental perspective and a wider institutional perspective.

Section 2 provides context for how the concept and organization of societal safety in Norway is understood within this research. Section 3 describes the research methodology, and Section 4 presents our main findings. In Section 5, we discuss our findings through instrumental and institutional perspectives. The paper concludes by discussing the country’s challenges in the area of emergency preparedness in the context of today’s increasingly complex society.

Section snippets

The two perspectives

In order to understand the changes that have taken place since July 22, we analyzed the changes using two approaches: the instrumental approach and the institutional approach (Table 1). The instrumental perspective focuses on formal organizations and views organizations as tools for leaders to achieve their goals (Fimreite, 2014). This perspective examines members of an organization following a logic of consequence, as one tries to predict the possible consequences of a specific action using a

Societal safety in Norway after 2011

In Norway, societal safety refers to protection against a variety of threats, including factors that are normally associated with security. The concept has been defined differently in various public documents. Here, we apply Olsen et al.’s. (2007) definition of social safety as “society's ability to maintain critical social functions, protect the life and health of citizens, and meet citizens’ basic requirements in a variety of stressful situations.” This definition encompasses the ability to

Methods

The methods used in this qualitative study were inspired by grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). The interview data were analyzed as soon as it was collected in order to capture important themes (Corbin and Strauss, 1990). An iterative process was used, meaning that the initial findings to include relevant questions or focus on emerging themes in the second-round interviews (Lingard et al., 2008). The frequency of different themes brought up in the interviews helped determine their

Results

We identified four interrelated major changes following the 2011 attacks: (1) a change in risk perception, (2) the generation of several number of plans and measures, (3) changes in organizational structures, and (4) increased resources for emergency planning. In this section, we present and discuss interview quotes that are representative of our findings.

Discussion

Our study results indicate several developments in Norway’s civil protection and emergency preparedness. Some aspects, however, are more easily changed than others. Evidence shows that each sector’s persisting sectorial focus and pride in its respective area of expertise act as a stumbling block to cooperation efforts. These turf wars are brought about by formal frameworks and cultures with conflicting views, values, and priorities. Additionally, the weight given to the latest crisis results in

Conclusion

In our study, we observed attempts to address the major inadequacies highlighted in the Gjørv Report’s broadly stated conclusions, especially those regarding security-related risks. Several plans and activities have been generated with the intent of acknowledging risks, learning, and achieving competence in emergency preparedness through various exercises, although the success of these actions remains to be seen.

The Gjørv Report’s main conclusion called for a change in attitudes, culture,

Acknowledgment

This work was conducted as part of the NEXUS project (The Next Disaster – Cooperation and Action Capacity in Norway After the July 22 Terror Attacks). The NEXUS project is financed by the Research Council of Norway within their ‘SAMRISK’ program. We would like to take this opportunity to sincerely thank Emery Roe for his remarkable efforts as acting editor. Special thanks to our anonymous reviewers for their constructive feedback on the paper. We would also like to show our gratitude to Jan

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