Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring
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Cited by (27)
Some notes and comments on the efficient use of information in repeated games with Poisson signals
2015, Operations Research LettersCitation Excerpt :found that the equilibrium degenerates in the limit. Fudenberg and Levine [4] suggest a Brownian “equivalent” formulation in which a deviation decreases the volatility. They show the existence of a non-trivial but not full efficient limit payoff.
Reputations in Repeated Games
2015, Handbook of Game Theory with Economic ApplicationsCitation Excerpt :It is not obvious that continuous-time games provide a fertile ground for studying reputations. Several examples have appeared in the literature under which intertemporal incentives can lose their force as time periods shrink in complete information games, as is the case in Abreu et al. (1991), Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007), and Fudenberg and Levine (2007). The difficulty is that as actions become frequent, the information observed in each period provides increasingly noisy indications of actions, causing the statistical tests for cheating to yield too many false positives and trigger too many punishments, destroying the incentives.
Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags
2014, Journal of Economic TheoryCitation Excerpt :Some sort of observation lags seem plausible in many cases; for example there may be a small probability that a player is momentarily inattentive and temporarily does not see his or her partner's actions; more strongly, in some cases a player may never learn just what happened during moments of inattention. Moreover, information lags of multiple periods seem especially appropriate in settings for which the time period under consideration is extremely short (Fudenberg and Levine [14,16] and Sannikov and Skrzypacz [34]), and in continuous-time models, where the “period length” is effectively 0 (Bergin and MacLeod [6], Sannikov [32], Sannikov and Skrzypacz [33], and Faingold and Sannikov [12]).2 The rest of the paper allows the lag distribution to have unbounded support, and also allows for a small probability that some signals never arrive at all (corresponding to an infinite observation lag).
Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal
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