Elsevier

Progress in Neurobiology

Volume 78, Issues 3–5, February–April 2006, Pages 322-326
Progress in Neurobiology

Reflections on the interaction of the mind and brain

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pneurobio.2006.02.003Get rights and content

Abstract

Problems associated with the topic of the mind–brain interaction are reviewed and analyzed. If there is an interaction, then the “mind” and “brain” are independent variables; the mind represents subjective experience and is therefore a non-physical phenomenon. This fact led to the need for a field theory, termed here the “cerebral mental field” (CMF). By definition, the CMF is a system property produced by the appropriate activities of billions of neurons. An experimental test of this theory is possible and a test design is presented. The most direct experimental evidence has been obtained by use of intracranial stimulating and recording electrodes. Important information has also been developed, however, with extracranial imaging techniques. These can be very fast (in ms), but the cerebral neuronal events that produce changes in physiological properties require a time delay for their processing. A number of surprising time factors affecting the appearance of a subjective somatosensory experience are described, and their wider implications are discussed. Among these is a delay (up to 0.5 s) in the generation of a sensory awareness. Thus, unconscious cerebral processes precede a subjective sensory experience. If this can be generalized to all kinds of subjective experiences, it would mean that all mental events begin unconsciously and not just those that never become conscious. In spite of the delay for a sensory experience, subjectively there appears to be no delay. Evidence was developed to demonstrate that this phenomenon depends on an antedating of the delayed experience. There is a subjective referral backward in time to coincide with the time of the primary cortical response to the earliest arriving sensory signal. The subjective referral in time is analogous to the well-known subjective referral in space. In conclusion, features of the CMF can be correlated with brain events, even though the CMF is non-physical, by study of subjective reports from the human subject.

Introduction

The generally held assumption that mind and brain can interact indicates from the outset that two different phenomenological entities exist. Conscious mind can only be regarded as a subjective experience, which is accessible only to the individual who has it. Thus, it can only be studied by reports given by the subject her/himself. It cannot be observed or studied by an external observer with any type of physical device. In this sense, subjective experience (the conscious mind) appears to be a non-physical phenomenon. Indeed, it was recognized as far back as Gottfried Leibniz (1646–1716) that if one could look into the brain and observe all its nerve cell activities, one would not see anything to indicate the existence of a conscious mind. In contrast, Pierre-Simone Marquis de Laplace (1749–1827) believed that if the nature of the molecules and structures in any system were known, one could describe and predict all of its behaviors (Laplace, 1914). Laplace was thus the ultimate materialist! Even if one believes Laplace's views, they could never be tested, of course, because impossibly large numbers of elements are involved. It is also necessary to accommodate the unpredictable effects of random events (chaos theory) and the uncertainty principle of Werner Heisenberg (1901–1976). Similar untestabilities apply to any materialist theory of mind.

How do the materialist's molecules and structures give rise to subjective experience? Simply stating that some (unknown) configuration of neuronal activities equals consciousness (subjective experience) avoids or begs the problem.

Section snippets

Contributions of John Eccles to the problem of mind–brain interactions

At this point it is relevant to consider the contributions of Sir John Carew Eccles (1903–1997) to the problem of mind–brain interactions. “Jack” (to his colleagues) was a remarkable contributor even to a field far removed from his superb experimental discoveries on the mechanisms of synaptic transmission and functional controls within the central nervous system (see the reports of Brownstone, 2006, Burke, 2006, Willis, 2006, Hultborn, 2006, Wolpaw and Carp, 2006, Andersen, 2006, Ito, 2006,

The cerebral mental field (CMF)

Hiroomi Umezawa and his followers proposed a mental field model, which they termed a “quantum field theory.” It was claimed by the authors that this theory is distinguishable from “quantum mechanics” (Umezawa, 1993). Their model is mostly mathematical, however, and it is not clear how it can be tested. In the interpretation of quantum theory by Nils Bohr (1885–1962), mind and matter are two aspects of one undivided process. David Böhm (1917–1992) adopted this idea (see Böhm and Factor, 1985).

Extracranial studies

In recent decades, brain imaging studies, including PET scans and MRI, have been numerous and significant. They can provide information on changes in blood flow in localized areas of the brain, as well as activity-dependent changes in specific metabolites. David Ingvar and his colleagues initiated direct study of blood flow patterns (for review, see Ingvar, 1999). In their initial experiments, changes in local blood flow were observed not only during voluntary acts but also when the subject

Concluding thoughts

The nature of the interaction between mind and brain is clearly difficult to understand, since it involves the production of non-physical subjective experiences by appropriate neuronal activities. If an experimental test of the CMF was to be carried out, like that described above, it might confirm or contradict the kind of alternatives possible for a mind–brain interaction. The eminent neuroscientist, Robert W. Doty, has remarked to me that he does not believe that a CMF test will produce a

Acknowledgements

For our experimental intracranial studies, I am indebted to the cooperative patients who underwent therapeutic neurosurgery and to my colleagues, Bertram Feinstein, W. Watson Alberts, Elwood (Bob) Wright Jr., and Curtis Gleason. I would also like to express my gratitude for the possibility to work with Eccles on cellular issues in Canberra, Australia (1956–1957) and his sustained interest in and support of my subsequent studies on the human brain. Re the latter, many leading neuroscientists

References (41)

  • R.W. Sperry

    Mind–brain interaction: mentalism, yes; dualism, no

    Neuroscience

    (1980)
  • D.G. Stuart et al.

    The academic lineage of Sir John Carew Eccles (1903–1997)

    Prog. Neurobiol.

    (2006)
  • M. Wiesendanger

    Eccles’ perspective of the forebrain, its role in skilled movement, and the mind-brain problem

    Prog. Neurobiol.

    (2006)
  • W.D. Willis

    John Eccles’ studies of spinal cord presynaptic inhibition

    Prog. Neurobiol.

    (2006)
  • J.R. Wolpaw et al.

    Plasticity from muscle to brain

    Prog. Neurobiol.

    (2006)
  • F. Beck et al.

    Quantum aspects of brain activity and the role of consciousness

    Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

    (1992)
  • Beck, F., Eccles, J.C. (deceased), 1998. Quantum processes in the brain: a scientific basis of consciousness. Ninchi...
  • Beck, F., Eccles, J.C. (deceased), 2003. Quantum processes in the brain: a scientific basis of, consciousness. In:...
  • J. de Fockert et al.

    Neural correlates of attentional capture in visual search

    J. Cogn. Neurosci.

    (2004)
  • Cited by (0)

    View full text