Elsevier

Physics Letters A

Volume 333, Issues 1–2, 29 November 2004, Pages 46-50
Physics Letters A

Improving Wójcik's eavesdropping attack on the ping–pong protocol

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physleta.2004.10.025Get rights and content

Abstract

The eavesdropping scheme proposed by Wójcik [Phys. Rev. Lett. 90 (2003) 157901] on the ping–pong protocol [Phys. Rev. Lett. 89 (2002) 187902] is improved by constituting a new set of attack operations. The improved scheme only induces half of the eavesdropping-induced channel loss in Wójcik's scheme, therefore, in a larger domain of the quantum channel transmission efficiency η, i.e., [0,75%], the eavesdropper Eve can attack all the transmitted bits. The improvement of the ping–pong protocol security produced by Wójcik's is also suitable for our eavesdropping attack.

Section snippets

Acknowledgments

Zhang thanks to Prof. Baiwen Li for his encouragement. We would like to thank the referee very much for his/her valuable opinions on this Letter. This work is funded by the National Science Foundation of China under No. 10304022.

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