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doi:10.1016/j.peva.2007.02.002 
Copyright © 2007 Elsevier Ltd All rights reserved.
Performance of the Vickrey auction for digital goods under various bid distributions
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M. Naldi
, a, 
and G. D’Acquistoa,
Received 1 October 2005;
revised 26 July 2006;
accepted 3 February 2007.
Available online 8 February 2007.
Abstract
The generalized Vickrey auction is analysed as a mechanism for setting prices of digital goods. A selection of models of the bidders’ behaviour (embodied by the probability distribution of their bids’ values) are employed to derive the optimal auctioneer’s choice as to the number of items to sell. The satisfaction levels of both the auctioneer and the bidders are taken into account through the evaluation of the expected revenues, the percentage of winning bidders and their aggregated utilities under each of the probabilistic scenarios considered.
Keywords: Auctions; Vickrey; Digital goods; Bid distributions
Article Outline
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Evaluation framework
- 3. The uniform distribution of bids
- 4. The triangular distribution of bids
- 5. The Gaussian distribution of bids
- 6. The exponential distribution of bids
- 7. The Pareto distribution of bids
- 8. Mismatched choices of the probability model
- 9. A priori and a posteriori implementations of the Vickrey auction
- 10. Conclusions
- References
- Vitae
