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doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.05.008    
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Copyright © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Laddering in initial public offeringsstar, open

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(Grace) Qing HaoCorresponding Author Contact Information, a, E-mail The Corresponding Author

aDepartment of Finance, College of Business, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO 65211-2600, USA


Received 28 February 2006; 
revised 5 May 2006; 
accepted 26 May 2006. 
Available online 6 March 2007.

Abstract

Laddering is a practice whereby the allocating underwriter requires the ladderer to buy additional shares of the issuer in the aftermarket as a condition for receiving shares at the offer price. This paper identifies factors that create incentives to engage in this type of manipulation and models the effect of laddering on initial public offering (IPO) pricing. I show that laddering has a bigger effect on the market price of IPOs with greater expected underpricing (without laddering) and greater expected momentum in the aftermarket; laddering increases the IPO offer price, the aftermarket price, and the money left on the table but does not necessarily increase the percentage underpricing; laddering contributes to long-run underperformance and creates a negative correlation between short-run and long-run returns; and profit-sharing increases the extent of laddering and the percentage underpricing.

Keywords: Laddering; IPO underpricing; Manipulation; Momentum

JEL classification codes: G24; G28; K22

Article Outline

1. Introduction
2. The model
2.1. The timing
2.2. Effect of laddering on IPO pricing
2.2.1. The benchmark case
2.2.2. The effect of laddering
2.3. The effect of information momentum on laddering
2.4. The effect of profit-sharing on laddering
3. Empirical implications
4. Conclusions
Appendix. Proofs of propositions
References


star, openThis paper is based on a chapter of my Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Florida. I am very grateful to my dissertation committee members, Christopher James, Joel Houston, Joel Demski, and especially Jay Ritter (chair) for valuable suggestions and support. I thank two anonymous referees, Ralph Bachmann, Alon Brav, David Carter, Bruce Foerster, David Sappington, Ann Sherman, Kent Womack, Jimmy Yang, Donghang Zhang, and seminar participants at the University of Florida, the University of Missouri-Columbia, the 2004 Financial Management Association Meetings, and the 2004 Southern Finance Association Meetings for helpful comments. All errors are my own.


Corresponding Author Contact InformationTel.: +1 573 884 1446; fax: +1 573 884 6296.

 
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