doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.05.008
Copyright © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Laddering in initial public offerings
References and further reading may be available for this article. To view references and further reading you must
purchase this article.
(Grace) Qing Hao
, a, 
aDepartment of Finance, College of Business, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO 65211-2600, USA
Received 28 February 2006;
revised 5 May 2006;
accepted 26 May 2006.
Available online 6 March 2007.
Abstract
Laddering is a practice whereby the allocating underwriter requires the ladderer to buy additional shares of the issuer in the aftermarket as a condition for receiving shares at the offer price. This paper identifies factors that create incentives to engage in this type of manipulation and models the effect of laddering on initial public offering (IPO) pricing. I show that laddering has a bigger effect on the market price of IPOs with greater expected underpricing (without laddering) and greater expected momentum in the aftermarket; laddering increases the IPO offer price, the aftermarket price, and the money left on the table but does not necessarily increase the percentage underpricing; laddering contributes to long-run underperformance and creates a negative correlation between short-run and long-run returns; and profit-sharing increases the extent of laddering and the percentage underpricing.
Keywords: Laddering; IPO underpricing; Manipulation; Momentum
JEL classification codes: G24; G28; K22
 |
Fig. 1. Timeline and price evolution. Panel A describes the actions of the underwriter and the ladderer over time. qI is the allocation to informed investors. P0 is the offer price. Panel B depicts the evolution of price over time with and without information momentum. The market's demand curve for the initial public offering (IPO) stock is denoted by D1, and -b is the slope of the demand function, where b>0. The immediate aftermarket price of the IPO stock with Q0 shares issued is assumed to be
if there is no laddering. With laddering, qL shares are allocated to ladderers and they buy λqL additional shares in the aftermarket, reducing the share supply to others by (1+λ)qL and boosting the immediate aftermarket price to
. Without an information momentum effect, when the ladderers sell all their shares at time 2, the market price
is equal to
. With an information momentum effect, when the ladderers sell all their shares at time 2, the demand curve for the firm's stock has been shifted upward by an amount of
to D2, where M(·) is the information momentum effect function. Therefore, the market price at time 2 becomes
.
 |
Fig. 2. Annual average of market-adjusted returns over the first 18 trading days during 1985–2002. Closing prices are from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. The market return is the value-weighted Nasdaq composite (including distributions). The original initial public offering (IPO) sample is from the Thomson Financial database. American Depositary Receipts, units, spinoffs, reverse leveraged buyouts, stocks with an offer price of $5 or less, and stocks that do not have the relevant prices in the CRSP database are eliminated, leaving a final sample of 4,411 IPO stocks during 1985–2002. For year j, the average market-adjusted return over the first 18 trading days after the offer date is measured as
, where Nj refers to the total number of IPOs in year j, and Mi,18 and Mi,1 refer to the Nasdaq composite levels (including distributions) on the 18th and the first trading days for stock i, respectively. Although dividends on IPOs are not included, less than 1% of IPOs paid a dividend during the first 18 trading days. (A) Cross-sectional average; (B) time-series average; (C) cold IPOs; (D) tepid IPOs; (E) warm IPOs; (F) hot IPOs; (G) extra-hot IPOs.
This paper is based on a chapter of my Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Florida. I am very grateful to my dissertation committee members, Christopher James, Joel Houston, Joel Demski, and especially Jay Ritter (chair) for valuable suggestions and support. I thank two anonymous referees, Ralph Bachmann, Alon Brav, David Carter, Bruce Foerster, David Sappington, Ann Sherman, Kent Womack, Jimmy Yang, Donghang Zhang, and seminar participants at the University of Florida, the University of Missouri-Columbia, the 2004 Financial Management Association Meetings, and the 2004 Southern Finance Association Meetings for helpful comments. All errors are my own.

Tel.: +1 573 884 1446; fax: +1 573 884 6296.