Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships
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Cited by (18)
On the incentive effects of job rotation
2017, European Economic ReviewCitation Excerpt :Thus, the equilibrium effort in our model represents a finite time analogue of the career concerns result (without strategic skill accumulation) of Cisternas (2017a) for the cases of constant ability and no discounting over time.5 Models of the long-run sustainability of reputation incentives emphasize the importance of mechanisms through which type uncertainty is replenished (Cripps et al., 2004; 2007). There are many ways to model such mechanisms.
Is more information always better? A case in credit markets
2017, Journal of Economic Behavior and OrganizationReputations in Repeated Games
2015, Handbook of Game Theory with Economic ApplicationsCitation Excerpt :In this case, opponents will never be completely certain of a player's type. At first glance, it would seem that this can only reinforce the temporary-reputation arguments of Cripps et al. (2004, 2007), making it more difficult to find persistent reputation effects. However, this very transience of reputations creates incentives to continually invest in reputation building, in order to assure opponents that one's type has not changed, opening the door for persistent reputations.
Disappearance of reputations in two-sided incomplete-information games
2014, Games and Economic BehaviorCitation Excerpt :Consequently, the eventual play is an equilibrium of the complete-information game that makes the reputation effects a short-run phenomenon. Moreover, following the footsteps of Cripps et al. (2007), the disappearance of reputations can be shown to be uniform across all Nash equilibria. The results on the disappearance of reputations has led to the question of how to explain long-term reputation effects.
Impermanent types and permanent reputations
2012, Journal of Economic TheoryCitation Excerpt :A patient long-run player who faces a sequence of short-run players who believe their opponent might be committed to a particular stage-game action benefits from such a perception, as shown by [11,12]. However, [6,7] show that if the long-run playerʼs actions are imperfectly observed by short-run players, reputation effects eventually disappear almost surely, at every equilibrium. This is particularly troubling since it shows that the original model cannot explain survival of reputation effects in environments where the agents have a long history.2
Informational externalities and emergence of consensus
2009, Games and Economic Behavior