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doi:10.1016/j.jet.2006.02.002 
Copyright © 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Information transmission in coalitional voting games
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Received 12 April 2005;
Abstract
A core allocation of a complete information economy can be characterized as one that would not be unanimously rejected in favor of another feasible alternative by any coalition. We use this test of coalitional voting in an incomplete information environment to formalize a notion of resilience. Since information transmission is implicit in the Bayesian equilibria of such voting games, this approach makes it possible to derive core concepts in which the transmission of information among members of a coalition is endogenous. Our results lend support to the credible core of Dutta and Vohra [Incomplete information, credibility and the core, Math. Soc. Sci. 50 (2005) 148–165] and the core proposed by Myerson [Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information, Mimeo, University of Chicago, 2005] as two that can be justified in terms of coalitional voting.
Keywords: Core; Incomplete information; Coalitional voting; Resilience; Mediation
JEL classification codes: C71; C72; D51; D82
