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Journal of Economic Theory
Volume 125, Issue 2, December 2005, Pages 151-188
 
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doi:10.1016/j.jet.2005.04.004    
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Copyright © 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Pairwise kidney exchange

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Alvin E. Rotha, b, Corresponding Author Contact Information, E-mail The Corresponding Author, Tayfun Sönmezc and M. Utku Ünverd

aDepartment of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA

bHarvard Business School, Boston, MA 02163, USA

cDepartment of Economics, Boston College, 140 Commonwealth Ave., Chestnut Hill, MA 02163, USA

dDepartment of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, 4S01 Posvar Hall, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA


Received 15 September 2004; 
revised 13 April 2005. 
Available online 31 May 2005.

Abstract

The literature on exchange of indivisible goods finds natural application in the exchange of live donor kidneys for transplant. However, in kidney exchange, there are constraints on the size of exchanges. Initially, kidney exchanges are likely to be between just two patient–donor pairs. We show that, although this constraint eliminates some potential exchanges, there is a wide class of constrained-efficient mechanisms that are strategy-proof when patient–donor pairs and surgeons have 0–1 preferences. This includes deterministic mechanisms that accommodate the priority setting that organ banks currently use to allocate cadaver organs, and stochastic mechanisms that allow distributive justice issues to be addressed.

Keywords: Market design; Matching; Kidney exchange; Priority mechanism; Egalitarian mechanism; Lorenz dominance

JEL classification: C78; D02; D63; I10


Corresponding Author Contact InformationCorresponding author. Department of Economics, Harvard Business School, Boston, MA 02467, USA.

Journal of Economic Theory
Volume 125, Issue 2, December 2005, Pages 151-188
 
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