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doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2005.04.003    
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Copyright © 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

On preferences and doing the right thing: Satisfaction with advantageous inequity when cognitive processing is limitedstar, open

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Kees van den Bosa, Corresponding Author Contact Information, E-mail The Corresponding Author, Susanne L. Petersa, D. Ramona Bobocelb and Jan Fekke Ybemac

aDepartment of Social and Organizational Psychology, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands

bUniversity of Waterloo, Canada

cNetherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research, Hoofddorp, The Netherlands


Received 6 May 2004; 
revised 19 February 2005. 
Available online 13 June 2005.

Abstract

We examine outcome satisfaction in situations in which people receive better outcomes than comparable other persons. Building on classical and modern social psychological theories, we argue that when reacting to these arrangements of advantageous inequity, judging the advantage is quick and easy as preferences are primary. We further propose that adjusting this appraisal requires cognitive resources as it entails integrating fairness concerns with the initial preference appraisal. Extending the literature on cognitive busyness, we therefore predict that people should be more satisfied with advantageous inequity when cognitive processing is strongly—as opposed to weakly—limited. Findings across several different experimental paradigms support our predictions. Taken together, our findings shed light on the psychological processes underlying the intriguing interplay between egoism- and fairness-based considerations when evaluating outcomes, as well as on more general preference and adjustment processes.

Keywords: Fairness; Justice; Equity; Preferences; Cognitive busyness

Article Outline

How do people usually evaluate advantageous inequity?
Satisfaction with advantageous inequity and cognitive busyness
Experiment 1
Method
Participants and design
Experimental procedure
Results
Recalled symbols
Outcome satisfaction
Discussion
Experiment 2
Method
Participants and design
Experimental procedure
Results
Response latencies
Outcome satisfaction
Discussion
Experiment 3
Method
Participants and design
Experimental procedure
Results
Relative outcomes
Justice judgments
Recalled symbols
Cognitive busyness
Comparability measures
Outcome satisfaction
Discussion
Experiment 4
Method
Participants and design
Experimental procedure
Results
Recalled symbols
Cognitive busyness
Justice judgments
Outcome satisfaction
General discussion
Implications
Future research
References

star, openWe thank Henk Aarts, Johan Karremans, Mel Lerner, Wolfgang Stroebe, Remco Wijn, and several anonymous reviewers for their comments on previous versions of this paper, and Sophie de Vente, Erik Eizema, and Parcival von Schmid for their assistance with Experiment 4.


Corresponding Author Contact InformationCorresponding author. Fax: +31 30 253 4718.

 
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