Copyright © 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
An attack on a payment scheme
Received 30 March 2007;
revised 15 October 2007;
accepted 18 October 2007.
Available online 30 October 2007.
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Abstract
Recently, Wang et al. have proposed an offline payment scheme providing scalable anonymity. The authors claim that their scheme can prevent a consumer from spending a coin more than once, since after a double-spending the identity of the consumer is revealed.
In this paper, we show that in Wang et al.’s scheme, given a valid coin and without knowing any secret information, everyone is able to spend the coin as many times as he wants. In particular, we show how a cheater, using only public information, can construct a faked proof of ownership of the coin without running any risk of being discovered.
Keywords: Electronic-cash; Double-spending; Anonymity







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