ScienceDirect® Home Skip Main Navigation Links
You have guest access to ScienceDirect. Find out more.
 
Home
Browse
My Settings
Alerts
Help
 Quick Search
 Search tips (Opens new window)
    Clear all fields    
advertisementadvertisement
Information and Computation
Volume 205, Issue 8, August 2007, Pages 1235-1273
 
Font Size: Decrease Font Size  Increase Font Size
 Abstract - selected
Purchase PDF (458 K)

  E-mail Article   
  Add to my Quick Links   
Bookmark and share in 2collab (opens in new window)
Request permission to reuse this article
  Cited By in Scopus (0)
 
 
 
Related Articles in ScienceDirect
View More Related Articles
 
View Record in Scopus
 
doi:10.1016/j.ic.2007.01.001    How to Cite or Link Using DOI (Opens New Window)
Copyright © 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Controlling information release in the π-calculusstar, open

Silvia Crafaa, Corresponding Author Contact Information, E-mail The Corresponding Author and Sabina Rossib, E-mail The Corresponding Author

aDipartimento di Matematica Pura e Applicata, Università di Padova, Italy bDipartimento di Informatica, Università Ca’ Foscari di Venezia, Italy

Received 15 July 2005; 
revised 15 December 2006. 
Available online 21 January 2007.

Purchase the full-text article



References and further reading may be available for this article. To view references and further reading you must purchase this article.

Abstract

We introduce a notion of controlled information release for a typed version of the π-calculus extended with declassification primitives; this property scales to noninterference when downgrading is not allowed. We provide various characterizations of controlled release, based on a typed behavioural equivalence relative to a security level σ, which captures the idea of external observers of level σ. First, we define our security property through a universal quantification over all the possible active attackers, i.e., malicious processes which interact with the system possibly leaking secret information. Then we characterize the controlled release property in terms of an unwinding condition, which deals with so-called passive attackers trying to infer confidential information just by observing the behaviour of the system. Furthermore, we express controlled information release in terms of partial equivalence relations (per models, for short) in the style of a stream of similar studies for imperative and multi-threaded languages. We show that the controlled release property is compositional with respect to most operators of the language leading to efficient proof techniques for the verification and the construction of (compositional) secure systems.

Keywords: Process Algebra; Noninterference; Downgrading


Information and Computation
Volume 205, Issue 8, August 2007, Pages 1235-1273
 
Home
Browse
My Settings
Alerts
Help
Elsevier.com (Opens new window)
About ScienceDirect  |  Contact Us  |  Information for Advertisers  |  Terms & Conditions  |  Privacy Policy
Copyright © 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. ScienceDirect® is a registered trademark of Elsevier B.V.