Pre-match investment with frictions☆
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This work is based on Chapter 4 of my dissertation from the University of British Columbia. Thanks to participants in the 2008 Canadian Economics Association Meetings (Vancouver) and the Development, Institutions, Environment, and Trade lunch at UBC. Thanks for various valuable comments are especially due to Ken Jackson, Patrick Francois, Gorkem Celik, Phil Curry and two anonymous referees. All errors are mine.
Copyright © 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.