In this study, we conduct a laboratory experiment to evaluate three alternative mechanisms for pricing transfers between a buyer and a seller. The three mechanisms are: (1) a direct negotiation mechanism with which either party suggests terms of trade that the other can accept or reject; (2) a traditional mechanism where the transfer price and quantity are determined by the intersection of the reported demand and supply schedules of the buyer and seller, respectively; and (3) the Ronen-McKinney mechanism which computes the transfer quantity in the same way as the traditional mechanism, but is designed to give different transfer prices to the buyer and seller in order to induce them to truthfully report their respective schedules. For all periods of the experiment, the direct negotiation mechanism is the least efficient of the three due to the high frequency of bargaining impasses. The efficiency of the traditional mechanism and the efficiency of the Ronen-McKinney mechanism are indistinguishable from one another. However, in the last four periods of the experiment where the data exhibit less volatility, the efficiencies of all three mechanisms are indistinguishable from each other. When truthful reporting is considered, the Ronen-McKinney mechanism had the least amount of misreporting followed by the traditional mechanism and then the direct negotiation mechanism.