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European Journal of Operational Research
Volume 180, Issue 1, 1 July 2007, Pages 262-281
 
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doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2006.04.002    How to Cite or Link Using DOI (Opens New Window)
Copyright © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Production, Manufacturing and Logistics

Pricing policies under direct vs. indirect channel competition and national vs. store brand competition

Hisashi Kurataa, Corresponding Author Contact Information, E-mail The Corresponding Author, Dong-Qing Yaob and John J. Liuc

aSchool of Business Administration, The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 3202 N. Maryland Ave., Milwaukee, WI 53201, USA bCollege of Business and Economics, Towson University, 8000 York Road, Towson, MD, 21252–0001, USA cDepartment of Logistics, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hung Hom, Kowloon, Hong Kong

Received 10 March 2005; 
accepted 3 April 2006. 
Available online 8 June 2006.

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Abstract

This paper analyzes channel pricing in multiple distribution channels under competition between a national brand (NB) and a store brand (SB), where an NB can be distributed both through a direct channel (e-channel) and an indirect channel (local stores) but an SB can be distributed only through an indirect channel. We first explore cross-brand and cross-channel pricing policies. Formulating the problem as a Nash pricing game, we reach two findings: (1) brand loyalty building is profitable for both an NB and an SB; and (2) marketing decisions are more restrictive for an NB channel than they are for the SB channel. We next assess supply chain coordination and reach two findings: (1) wholesale price change does not coordinate the supply chain and (2) an appropriate combination of markup and markdown prices can achieve both supply chain coordination and a win–win outcome for each channel.

Keywords: Supply chain management; Pricing; Brand management; Channel competition; Comparative statics

Article Outline

1. Introduction
2. Price competition system
2.1. Supply chain structure
2.2. Customer choice perspectives
3. Model
4. Analyses and marketing insights
4.1. Analysis of Nash equilibrium prices
4.2. Verifying the model with close-to-reality data and discussions
4.3. Marketing policies when a direct channel is completely segmented
4.4. Marketing policies when an SB is uniquely positioned
5. Supply chain coordination
6. Concluding remarks
Appendix. Appendix
References






 
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