Copyright © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Production, Manufacturing and Logistics
Pricing policies under direct vs. indirect channel competition and national vs. store brand competition
Received 10 March 2005;
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Abstract
This paper analyzes channel pricing in multiple distribution channels under competition between a national brand (NB) and a store brand (SB), where an NB can be distributed both through a direct channel (e-channel) and an indirect channel (local stores) but an SB can be distributed only through an indirect channel. We first explore cross-brand and cross-channel pricing policies. Formulating the problem as a Nash pricing game, we reach two findings: (1) brand loyalty building is profitable for both an NB and an SB; and (2) marketing decisions are more restrictive for an NB channel than they are for the SB channel. We next assess supply chain coordination and reach two findings: (1) wholesale price change does not coordinate the supply chain and (2) an appropriate combination of markup and markdown prices can achieve both supply chain coordination and a win–win outcome for each channel.
Keywords: Supply chain management; Pricing; Brand management; Channel competition; Comparative statics
Article Outline
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Price competition system
- 3. Model
- 4. Analyses and marketing insights
- 4.1. Analysis of Nash equilibrium prices
- 4.2. Verifying the model with close-to-reality data and discussions
- 4.3. Marketing policies when a direct channel is completely segmented
- 4.4. Marketing policies when an SB is uniquely positioned
- 5. Supply chain coordination
- 6. Concluding remarks
- Appendix. Appendix
- References







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