Abstract

Ecological and sensorimotor theories of perception build on the notion of action-dependent invariants as the basic structures underlying perceptual capacities. In this paper we contrast the assumptions these theories make on the nature of perceptual information modulated by action. By focusing on the question, how movement specifies perceptual information, we show that ecological and sensorimotor theories endorse substantially different views about the role of action in perception. In particular we argue that ecological invariants are characterized with reference to transformations produced in the sensory array by movement: such invariants are transformation-specific but do not imply motor-specificity. In contrast, sensorimotor theories assume that perceptual invariants are intrinsically tied to specific movements. We show that this difference leads to different empirical predictions and we submit that the distinction between motor equivalence and motor-specificity needs further clarification in order to provide a more constrained account of action/perception relations.

Keywords: Action; Perception; Self-motion; Invariants; Sensorimotor theories; Ecological psychology; Enaction

Article Outline

1. Blurring the boundary between action and perception

1.1. Radical approaches to action/perception relations

2. Framing the concept of action-dependent invariants

2.1. Ecological invariants

2.2. Sensorimotor invariants

2.3. Ecological vs. sensorimotor invariants

2.4. Motor-dependence vs. action-dependence

3. Motor-specificity: empirical predictions of the sensorimotor hypothesis

3.1. Active vs. passive perception

3.1.1. Perceptual substitution

3.1.2. Structure-from-motion

3.2. Perception in active vs. passive self-motion

3.3. Can motor-specific perceptual invariants shed light on action/perception relations

4. Conclusions

Acknowledgements

References