Abstract

Distributed solutions to resource allocation are motivated by the need to cope with the complexity in modern communication networks. The purpose of this paper is to discuss decentralized resource allocation in a self-organizing network from the viewpoint of potential games. The focus is on power allocation and scheduling in a congested distributed network such as a wireless ad hoc network.

Noncooperative resource allocation is studied as a “potential” game, where the potential function is a common proxy objective, formalizing the implicit joint target of the noncooperative players. The potential function can be used to evaluate the system-level efficiency of noncooperative resource allocation. Examples of potential games are discussed in various contexts of distributed resource allocation. A game with discrete or convex strategy sets possessing a potential function has convergent greedy dynamics. A resource price determines the structure of a potential game.

Keywords: Resource allocation; Power control; Game theory; Ad hoc networks

Article Outline

1. Introduction and related work

2. Distributed power control

2.1. Centralized PC and its distributed solution based on local information

2.2. Noncooperative power allocation

3. Resource allocation games of strategic substitutes/complements

3.1. Applications in power allocation games

3.2. Potential function

4. Potential games of power allocation

4.1. A received power game with binary discrete choice

4.2. A general utility model of power allocation

4.3. Transmit power allocation games

4.4. Weighted games

5. Distributed scheduling

5.1. Distributed scheduling in a time-division based system

5.2. Distributed scheduling in a multi-access network

6. Implementing efficient decentralized allocation

6.1. On congestion pricing

6.2. Agent-based resource allocation: potential approach

7. Concluding remarks

Appendix A

Appendix B. Appendix

Appendix C. Appendix

References