Several recent research results describe how to design Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs) that are robust to adversarial attack via Byzantine faults. Unfortunately, all of these results require a significant blowup in communication costs over standard DHTs. For example, to perform a lookup operation, all such robust DHTs of which we are aware require sending O(log³n) messages while standard DHTs require sending only O(logn), where n is the number of nodes in the network. In this paper, we describe protocols to reduce the communication costs of all such robust DHTs. In particular, we give a protocol to reduce the number of messages sent to perform a lookup operation from O(log³n) to O(log²n) in expectation. Moreover, we also give a protocol for sending a large (i.e. containing Ω(log⁴n) bits) message securely through a robust DHT that requires, in expectation, only a constant blowup in the total number of bits sent compared with performing the same operation in a standard DHT. This is an improvement over the O(log²n) bit blowup that is required to perform such an operation in all current robust DHTs. Both of our protocols are robust against an adaptive adversary.