Copyright © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Received 7 June 2004;
Abstract
In order to reduce the user latency, the web sites disseminate some of their information to surrogate caches located closer to the users. We discuss a simple differentiated service type architecture for content delivery networks. A pricing scheme is next proposed to complement this architecture and provide fair service to the subscribed publishers. Then, we show that the suggested pricing scheme is also the optimal (revenue maximizing) pricing scheme for a monopolistic surrogate. We investigate the performance of the pricing scheme in a duopoly and show that under certain conditions the competition results in peering of the surrogates. Finally, we suggest methods to determine the optimal number of service classes offered to the users.
Keywords: Network pricing; Market-based resource allocation; Game theoretical modeling of communication networks; Internet service classes under competition
Article Outline
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Differentiated services framework for content delivery
- 3. Optimal pricing strategy for a monopolistic surrogate
- 4. Optimal resource allocation among service classes
- 5. Game theoretical analysis of competition of surrogates
- 6. Optimal number of service classes
- 7. Conclusions and future work
- Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 1
- Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 2
- Appendix C. Proof Theorem 3
- Appendix D. Proof of Lemma 1
- References
- Vitae






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