Copyright © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
A DoS and fault-tolerant authentication protocol for group communications in ad hoc networks
Available online 1 May 2007.
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Abstract
In this paper, a novel authentication protocol is proposed, which satisfies both security and reliability requirements for group communications in ad hoc networks. The security features include identity anonymity and location intracability, periodic one-way session key and pseudonym identity refreshment with implicit authentication, dynamic joining and leaving an in-progress communication session, and data encryption. The reliability features include efficient Denial of Service tolerance for broadcasting refreshment messages, fault-tolerance for recovering lost refreshment messages, robustness for resisting the clock skews among member nodes and seamless key switch without disrupting ongoing data transmissions. The performance and security analysis show that the communication and computation overhead of the proposed protocol is similar to the existing one, while the security can be enhanced significantly. The simulation results demonstrate the robustness of the proposed protocol under severe Denial of Service attack and poor wireless channel quality.
Keywords: Authentication protocol; Forward secrecy; DoS-tolerant; Fault-tolerant; Ad hoc group communications
Article Outline
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Proposed DoS- and fault-tolerant authentication protocol
- 2.1. Architecture
- 2.2. Forward secrecy
- 2.3. Mutual authentication protocol
- 2.4. One-way CK&PID renewal mechanism
- 2.5. DoS-tolerant authentication mechanism
- 2.6. Fault-tolerant key recovery mechanism
- 2.7. Dynamic participation mechanism
- 2.8. Re-initialization mechanism
- 2.9. Robustness for clock skews
- 2.10. Message encryption/decryption and integrity mechanism
- 3. Security analysis
- 3.1. Identity anonymity and intracability analysis
- 3.2. Resistance to relay attack
- 3.3. Privacy of group conversation
- 3.4. Prevention of fraud
- 3.5. Forward secrecy mechanism
- 4. Performance analysis
- 4.1. Steady Markov state distribution
- 4.2. Communication overhead
- 4.3. Computation overhead
- 4.4. Comparison with existing protocol
- 5. Conclusion
- Acknowledgements
- References
- Vitae






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