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Computer Communications
Volume 30, Issue 1, 15 December 2006, Pages 55-65
 
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doi:10.1016/j.comcom.2006.07.015    How to Cite or Link Using DOI (Opens New Window)
Copyright © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Resilience of sink filtering scheme in wireless sensor networks

Miao Maa, E-mail The Corresponding Author

aInstitute for Infocomm Research (I2R), 21 Heng Mui Keng Terrace, Singapore 119613, Singapore

Received 5 May 2006; 
revised 20 July 2006; 
accepted 21 July 2006. 
Available online 22 August 2006.

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Abstract

One of severe security threats in wireless sensor network is node compromise. A compromised node can easily inject false data reports on the events that do not occur. The existing approaches in which each forwarding sensor along a path probabilistically filters out injected false data may not be adequate because such protection may break down when more than a threshold number of nodes are compromised. To solve this problem, we present a sink filtering scheme in clusters of heterogeneous sensor networks. In addition to basic sensors, some powerful data gathering sensors termed as cluster heads (CHs) are added. Each aggregation report generated by a CH must carry multiple keyed message authentication codes (MACs); each MAC is generated by a basic sensor that senses the event. The sink node checks the validity of the carried MACs in an aggregation report and filters out the forged report. We analyze the resilience and overhead of the sink filtering scheme. Both analytical and simulation results show that the scheme is resilient to an increasing number of compromised nodes, with graceful performance degradation. Particularly, we adopt Poisson Approximation to investigate the performance tradeoff between resilience and overall cost, and give some suggestions on how to choose the parameters. The scheme is also scalable and efficient in communication, computation and storage.

Keywords: Wireless sensor networks; Security; Node compromise; False data injection; Resiliency

Article Outline

1. Introduction
2. Assumptions and network model
3. Sink filtering scheme in clusters of heterogeneous sensor networks
3.1. Notations
3.2. Sink filtering scheme
4. Resilience behavior within a cluster
4.1. Compromising CH
4.2. Compromising basic sensors
4.3. Compromising CH and basic sensors simultaneously
5. Resilience analysis
5.1. Quantitative analysis
5.2. Poisson Approximation
5.3. Parameters selection
6. Overhead analysis
6.1. Communication overhead
6.2. Computation overhead
6.3. Storage requirement
6.4. Comparison
7. Conclusion
Acknowledgements
Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 5.1
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 5.3
References
Vitae






Computer Communications
Volume 30, Issue 1, 15 December 2006, Pages 55-65
 
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