The risk game
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Cited by (59)
Perception of risk in construction. Exploring the factors that influence experts in occupational health and safety
2021, Safety ScienceCitation Excerpt :A risk assessment requires drawing conclusions and making decisions (Zhou et al., 2015). Risk assessment is substantially subjective and represents a mixture of science and judgment with important psychological, social, cultural and political factors (Slovic, 1998). Experts do not escape these determinations because their determinations are embedded in social ties (Urteaga and Eizagirre, 2013).
Constructing risks – Internalisation of flood risks in the flood risk management plan
2017, Environmental Science and PolicyCitation Excerpt :Although these dangers are real, there is no such thing as ‘real risk’ or ‘objective risk”’ (Slovic, 1998). The worldview of a certain actor determines which dangers are magnified, while obscuring other threats, selecting others for minimal attention, or even disregarding some (Dake, 1992; Slovic, 1998; Pidgeon, 1998). Since risk is a perceptual concept, it is challenging to provide one clear definition of the term risk (Aven and Renn, 2010).
Health effects of technologies for power generation: Contributions from normal operation, severe accidents and terrorist threat
2016, Reliability Engineering and System SafetyClimate change, values, and the cultural cognition thesis
2015, Environmental Science and PolicyCitation Excerpt :We observe that risk can also be conceived as subjective – determined by beliefs and desires (Ramsey, 1990; Savage, 1954), perceived – fixed by contextual and personal factors (Slovic, 1999), felt – when it is conceived as risk-as-feelings (Loewenstein et al., 2001), or epistemic – governed by what we think we know when we are acting (Gärdenfors and Sahlin, 1983; Sahlin and Persson, 1994). We will not go into details here, but see for example Blennow et al. (2014) for a detailed exposition and critique of the minimalist perspectives in which risk is regarded as either physical or social (see also Slovic (1998) for a related position). A preoccupation with society or culture in the analysis of values, risk and adaptation appears, therefore, to be an artefact of the researcher's own interest, not an accurate delineation of the kinds of value that can exert influence on a decision-maker.
Assessing interdependent operational, tactical and strategic risks for improved utility master plans
2015, Water ResearchCitation Excerpt :Maxwell (2009) calls attention to the fact that despite the inherent advantages, bringing the experience and knowledge of the researcher into the research may lead to distortions in the methods and in the interpreting of the results. On the other hand, there is also the possibility for cognitive bias in the assessment of causal chains, barriers and their effectiveness by risk experts and managers, either by failing to recall relevant events, by misperceiving causal chains (Vlek, 2013) or even by exaggerating or underplaying the likelihood and consequences evaluation (Slovic, 1998; Renn, 2008). Furthermore, ‘group think’ can cause less vocal participants to be dominated by opinionated leaders (Vlek, 2013; Powers et al., 2012) and while individual interviews reflect consistent and coherent opinions (even if deliberately exaggerated), the need to reach consensus in a group may cause opinions to become incoherent (Cox, 2012).
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