Elsevier

World Development

Volume 29, Issue 5, May 2001, Pages 747-765
World Development

The Contested Role of Heterogeneity in Collective Action: Some Evidence from Community Forestry in Nepal

https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X(01)00012-2Get rights and content

Abstract

The role of heterogeneity in affecting the likelihood of collective action is strongly debated in the theoretical literature. We present evidence from a study of 18 forest user groups in Nepal. Heterogeneity is not a strong predictor of the level of collective activity. Rather, heterogeneity is a challenge that can be overcome by good institutional design when the interests of those controlling collective-choice mechanisms are benefited by investing time and effort to craft better rules.

Introduction

During the past decade, considerable theoretical and empirical research has demonstrated that it is possible, but not necessary, for groups of individuals jointly using the same common-pool resource to organize themselves so as to achieve relatively efficient outcomes from the continued use of a resource (Bromley et al., 1992; Blomquist, 1992; Tang, 1992; Lam, 1998; Ostrom, 1990; Baland & Platteau, 1996; Bardhan, 1993). Common-pool resources are man-made or natural systems that generate finite quantities of resource units so that one person's use subtracts from the quantity of resource units available to others (Ostrom, Gardner, & Walker, 1994). Most common-pool resources are sufficiently large that multiple actors are able to use the resource system simultaneously, and efforts to exclude potential beneficiaries are costly. Examples of common-pool resources include groundwater basins, irrigation systems, forests, and grazing lands. Examples of the resource units derived from common-pool resources include water, timber, and fodder.

When resource units are highly valued and many actors benefit from appropriating (harvesting) them for consumption, exchange, or as a factor in a production process, the appropriations made by one individual are likely to create negative externalities for others. Until recently, most resource policies have been based on a presumption that the appropriators of a resource are trapped in an open access situation. The possibility that the appropriators would find ways to organize themselves was not earlier given serious consideration in much of the policy literature. The growing evidence from many studies of common-pool resources in the field has called for a serious rethinking of the theoretical foundations for the analysis of common-pool resources (see Berkes, 1986, Berkes, 1989; Berkes, Feeny, McCay, & Acheson, 1989; McCay & Acheson, 1987). The consequence of these empirical studies is not to challenge the empirical validity of the conventional theory where it is relevant, but rather its generalizability. A substantial number of experimental studies of common-pool resources created in an experimental laboratory also challenge the generalizability of the conventional theory.1

A self-organized resource governance system exists where actors, who are major appropriators of the resource, are involved over time in making and adapting rules within collective-choice arenas regarding the inclusion or exclusion of participants, appropriation strategies, obligations of participants, monitoring and sanctioning, and conflict resolution. Some extremely remote common-pool resources are governed entirely by appropriators and are not governed at all by external authorities. In most modern political economies, however, it is rare to find any resource system that is governed entirely by participants without rules made by local, regional, national, and international authorities also affecting key decisions. Thus, in a self-governed system, participants make many, but not necessarily all, rules that affect the sustainability of the resource system and its use (Ostrom, 1991, Ostrom, 1997).

Section snippets

On the origin of self-governed common-pool resources

The conventional theory of the commons is most successful in predicting outcomes in settings where appropriators are alienated from one another or cannot communicate effectively. This theory does not provide an adequate explanation for settings where appropriators are able to create and sustain agreements to avoid serious problems of overappropriation. Nor does it predict well the conditions under which government ownership or private ownership will improve outcomes. Scholars familiar with the

Heterogeneity: a theoretical puzzle

Beyond the consensus concerning the variables most likely to enhance self-organization, many unresolved theoretical issues still exist. One question relates to the effect of heterogeneity in a group of appropriators. The impact of heterogeneity on the capacity of individuals to self-organize and sustain a common-property regime is highly contested. For one thing, groups can differ along a diversity of dimensions including their sociocultural backgrounds, interests, and endowments (see Baland

Differences among forest users in the middle hills of Nepal

The physiographic zone of the Middle Hills of Nepal provides the broad setting of this study (see Figure 1). The population is largely rural. Fewer than 10% of the total population of this region can be found in towns and cities. Subsistence agriculture is the main occupation, although villagers do not hesitate to supplement their livelihoods by entering the market economy whenever opportunities arise. The rural population in the Middle Hills is mostly distributed in small villages or hamlets

Findings: the association of collective action with differences among user groups

A look at Table 1 shows the association of collective action with trends in forest condition and with forest stock conditions. The measure of collective action is called degree of collective activity and indicates the extent to which local residents have organized themselves to manage forest use (see Varughese, 1999). The degree of collective activity is derived from a set of questions that asks whether there are rules (formal and informal) related to entry into a forest, harvesting in a

Conclusion

The findings from this study of 18 sites in Nepal indicate that differences among users do pose challenges for groups of forest users in overcoming the incentives to free ride and shirk. Heterogeneities, however, do not have a determinant impact on the likelihood or success of collective action. The attributes of different groups affect the structure of constitutional and collective-choice arenas within which users decide how to organize themselves and which rules to adopt to allocate rights

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