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Operations Research Letters
Volume 32, Issue 2, March 2004, Pages 114-120
 
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doi:10.1016/S0167-6377(03)00095-6    How to Cite or Link Using DOI (Opens New Window)
Copyright © 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Allocating electricity transmission costs through tracing: a game-theoretic rationale*1

P. A. KattumanCorresponding Author Contact Information, E-mail The Corresponding Author, a, R. J. GreenE-mail The Corresponding Author, b and J. W. BialekE-mail The Corresponding Author, c

a Judge Institute of Management, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 1AG, UK b University of Hull Business School, University of Hull, Hull HU6 7RX, UK c School of Engineering and Electronics, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh EH9 3JL, UK

Received 31 January 2003; 
revised 7 May 2003; 
accepted 15 May 2003. ;
Available online 8 July 2003.

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Abstract

Tracing is a method of assigning flows in an electricity network to particular generators and loads, assuming perfect mixing at each node. It can be used to assign costs to transmission users. We show that the resulting allocation is equal to the Shapley value of an equivalent co-operative game.

Author Keywords: Electricity transmission; Cost allocation; Shapley value

Article Outline

1. Introduction
2. The tracing methodology
2.1. The principle
2.2. Using the tracing-based methodology to allocate transmission charges
3. Game theoretic rationale of tracing
3.1. Cost allocation games
3.2. The game
3.2.1. Players
3.2.2. Coalitions
3.2.3. Shapley value
3.2.4. Allocation of inflows to out flows
4. Conclusion
References



 
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