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Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Volume 46, Issue 1, September 2001, Pages 73-100
 
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doi:10.1016/S0167-2681(01)00188-3    How to Cite or Link Using DOI (Opens New Window)
Copyright © 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

Equilibrium selection in a nonlinear duopoly game with adaptive expectations

Gian Italo Bischia and Michael KopelCorresponding Author Contact Information, E-mail The Corresponding Author, b

a Istituto di Scienze Economiche,University of Urbino, Urbino, Italy b Department of Managerial Economics and Industrial Organization, University of Technology, Vienna, Austria

Received 14 December 1999;
revised 22 August 2000;
accepted 29 August 2000
Available online 17 August 2001.

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Abstract

We analyze a nonlinear discrete time Cournot duopoly game, where players have adaptive expectations. The evolution of expected outputs over time is generated by the iteration of a noninvertible two-dimensional map. The long-run behavior is characterized by multistability, that is, the presence of coexisting stable consistent beliefs, which correspond to Nash equilibria in the quantity space. Hence, a problem of equilibrium selection arises and the long run outcome strongly depends on the choice of the players’ initial beliefs. We analyze the basins of attraction and their qualitative changes as the model parameters vary. We illustrate that the basins might be nonconnected sets and reveal the mechanism which is responsible for this often-neglected kind of complexity. The analysis of the global bifurcations which cause qualitative changes in the topological structure of the basins is carried out by the method of critical curves.

Author Keywords: Equilibrium selection problem; Duopoly games; Adaptive expectations; Basins of attraction; Critical curves

JEL classification codes: C72; D43; D83

Article Outline

1. Introduction
2. The model
3. Equilibrium beliefs and Nash equilibria
4. Homogeneous adaptive expectations
4.1. Naive expectations as a benchmark case
4.2. Analysis of local stability
5. Basins of coexisting equilibria in the case of homogeneous adaptive expectations
6. Heterogeneous adaptive expectations
7. Discussion
Acknowledgements
Appendix A. Proofs of Propositions 1, 2, 4
Appendix B. Critical curves and proof of Proposition 3
References







 
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