Abstract
Purchase PDF (271 K)
E-mail Article
Add to my Quick Links
Cited By in Scopus (8)
Purchase PDF (110 K)
doi:10.1016/S0165-1765(97)00079-7 
Two derivations of the uniform rule and an application to bankruptcy
Received 1 August 1996;
References and further reading may be available for this article. To view references and further reading you must purchase this article.
Abstract
We consider the problem of allocating a single infinitely divisible commodity to agents with single-peaked preferences, and establish two properties of the rule that has played the central role in the analysis of this problem, the uniform rule. Among the efficient allocations, it selects (1) the one at which the difference between the largest amount received by any agent and the smallest such amount is minimal, and (2) the one at which the variance of the amounts received by all the agents is minimal. We also show that an important solution for bankruptcy problems, the constrained equal-award solution, can be characterized by analogous minimization exercises, subject to different constraints. © 1997 Elsevier Science S.A.
Author Keywords: Single-peaked preferences; Uniform rule; Bankruptcy problems; Constrained equal award solution; Talmudic solution
JEL classification codes: D51; D63; D70
*Corresponding author. Fax: (716) 256-2309; e-mail: shmr@troi.cc.rochester.edu
