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Computer Communications
Volume 23, Issue 17, 1 November 2000, Pages 1681-1701
 
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doi:10.1016/S0140-3664(00)00255-3    
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Copyright © 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

Scalable secure one-to-many group communication using dual encryption

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L. R. DondetiCorresponding Author Contact Information, E-mail The Corresponding Author, a, S. Mukherjeeb and A. Samalc

a Nortel Networks, 600 Technology Park Drive, Mail stop: E65-60-202, Billerica, MA 01821, USA

b Panasonic Information and Networking Technology Laboratories, 2 Research Way, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA

c Department of Computer Science and Engineering, 115 Ferguson Hall, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Lincoln, NE 68588-0115, USA


Available online 30 November 2000.

Abstract

Multicasting is a scalable solution for group communication. Whereas secure unicast is a well-understood problem, scalable secure multicast poses several unique security problems, namely group membership control, scalable key distribution to a dynamic group. We address scalability in the proposed protocol by using hierarchical subgrouping. Third party hosts or members of the multicast group, designated as subgroup members, are responsible for secret key distribution and group membership management at the subgroup level. Unlike existing secure multicast protocols, our protocol, through dual encryption, can use “untrusted” subgroup managers (SGMs) to distribute data encryption keys securely. We analytically prove the correctness of the protocol in ensuring secure communication, describe possible collusion scenarios and our protocol's ability to overcome them. We compare our protocol with existing scalable key distribution schemes through simulation using real-life multicast traces and show that our protocol alleviates the encryption overhead at the sender by distributing some of the work among the SGMs. The proposed protocol performs better than the existing scalable protocols as the number of active members in a multicast group increases.

Author Keywords: Secure group communication; Key distribution; Multicast security; Hierarchical subgrouping

Article Outline

1. Introduction
2. Architecture of the key distribution tree
2.1. Group access control
2.2. Scalable key distribution
2.2.1. Subgroups
2.2.2. Key groups
2.3. Secure communication
3. Dynamic group membership management
3.1. Join protocol
3.2. Leave protocol
4. Security analysis of DEP
4.1. Protocol properties
4.2. Proof of correctness
4.3. Collusion analysis
5. Previous research in scalable key distribution
5.1. Centralized flat key management
5.2. Hierarchical key management
5.3. Distributed flat key management
5.4. Tabular comparison
6. Simulation results and performance comparison
6.1. Workload characterization
6.2. Performance comparison
6.2.1. Encryption cost at the sender
6.2.2. Encryption/decryption cost at the members and the SGMs
6.2.3. Distribution of encryption/decryption cost
6.3. Summary
7. Conclusion
Acknowledgements
Appendix A. Proofs
References
Vitae









Corresponding Author Contact Information Corresponding author. Tel.: +1-9782886406; fax: +1-9782880620; email: ldondeti@nortelnetworks.com


Computer Communications
Volume 23, Issue 17, 1 November 2000, Pages 1681-1701
 
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