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doi:10.1016/S0004-3702(02)00274-6 
Copyright © 2002 Published by Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
The influence of social norms and social consciousness on intention reconciliation
Barbara J. Grosz
, 
, a, Sarit Krausb, c, David G. Sullivana and Sanmay Dasd
a Division of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
b Department of Computer Science, Bar-Ilan University, Bar-Ilan, Israel
c Institute for Advanced Computer Studies, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742, USA
d MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA
Received 25 March 2001.
Abstract
Research on resource-bounded agents has established that rational agents need to be able to revise their commitments in light of new opportunities. In the context of collaborative activities, rational agents must be able to reconcile their intentions to do team-related actions with other, conflicting intentions. The SPIRE experimental system allows the process of intention reconciliation in team contexts to be simulated and studied. Initial work with SPIRE examined the impact of environmental factors and agent utility functions on individual and group outcomes in the context of one set of social norms governing collaboration. This paper extends those results by further studying the effect of environmental factors and the agents' level of social consciousness and by comparing the impact of two different types of social norms on agent behavior and outcomes. The results show that the choice of social norms influences the accuracy of the agents' responses to varying environmental factors, as well as the effectiveness of social consciousness and other aspects of agents' utility functions. In experiments using heterogeneous groups of agents, both sets of norms were susceptible to the free-rider effect. However, the gains of the less responsible agents were minimal, suggesting that agent designers would have little incentive to design agents that deviate from the standard level of responsibility to the group.
Author Keywords: Intention reconciliation; Collaborative systems; Teamwork
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Corresponding author. Maxwell-Dworkin Laboratory, Room 249, 33 Oxford Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA; email: grosz@eecs.harvard.edu
