The investment strategies of publicly sponsored venture capital funds
Highlights
► We examine the effects of public ownership on the investment strategy of VC funds. ► Public share has a negative correlation with the probability of write-off. ► A higher public share is associated with a longer duration for the investment. ► Effects are relevant for investments generating intermediate financial returns.
Introduction
It is well known that financial constraints are particularly acute for innovative entrepreneurial firms because their investment returns are uncertain, they have little collateral to secure debt, they are subject to higher informational frictions and their capital, which is mostly intangible, is difficult to redeploy and is characterized by relevant bankruptcy costs (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002, Hall, 2002).1 As entrepreneurial activities increasingly contribute to innovation and economic growth, policy makers have focused on implementing policies that enhance financing offerings for entrepreneurs by influencing their incentives and payoffs. In particular, evidence that more available venture capital (VC) allows for an increase in successful entrepreneurial activity (see, for example, Levine, 1997; Kortum and Lerner, 2000) has led many governments and regional authorities worldwide to implement programs to mobilize venture capital.
The available evidence on this type of policy intervention shows that there is a high degree of heterogeneity in the models that are adopted to support the development of VC funds in specific regions/countries and a contingent lack of comprehensive evaluation of the effects that they have encouraged. However, several works in the field of entrepreneurial finance have attempted to assess the economic properties, the efficacy, the social desirability and the risks of using this type of policy as a tool to support entrepreneurship and innovation (Gompers and Lerner, 1998, Cressy, 2002, Lerner, 2002, Leleux and Surlemont, 2003, Armour and Cumming, 2006, Da Rin et al., 2006). A first stream of research has focused on the impact of public policies on the environmental conditions in which private VC firms operate, including tax regimes for private equity operators, legal requirements for IPOs and LBOs, corporate governance legislation and the level of development of the financial markets (Da Rin et al., 2006, Leleux and Surlemont, 2003, Gilson, 2003). A second stream of research has addressed a specific type of public policy intervention: the direct co-funding of venture capital funds. Vehicles by which independent VC firms are used to channel and allocate public financial support are often termed “hybrid funds” (Jääskeläinen et al., 2007, NESTA, 2009). The present study focuses on this second type of public intervention.
Direct public support of VC initiatives, in principle tailored to the specific institutional context of the economic region of interest,2 has been aimed at increasing the aggregate pool of capital for entrepreneurs. In particular, the rationales often advocated for these policy interventions are that (i) the private sector provides insufficient capital to new, innovative firms and (ii) the government can drive the investment selection process towards investment opportunities that will ultimately yield high social returns (in addition to the private ones) (Lerner, 2002).
The present study investigates the effects of public ownership on the investment strategy of hybrid VC funds; these effects are ultimately reflected both in the ex-ante selection process for the target companies and in their post-acquisition management. The intensity of public ownership can have different implications along these two dimensions.
We use a dataset of 179 venture capital funds that received financial support from the European Investment Fund (EIF), the European Union body specializing in SME equity financing.3 The primary advantage of the EIF dataset is the high reliability and the completeness of the information available on each deal. For its investment activity, EIF deploys either its own resources or resources mandated by its shareholders. EIF’s investment in the analyzed funds is regulated by the Risk Capital Mandate (European Investment Bank). Target VC funds must be in compliance with the EIF’s objectives and operational guidelines, as well as with the Risk Capital Mandate Investment Guidelines. Investments in eligible funds are made after a detailed due diligence is carried out on all aspects of the investment proposal. Particular attention is paid to the quality of the funds’ management teams, to their degree of focus on the type of companies targeted by the Mandate facility and to their potential to contribute to the growth of these companies while, at the same time, generating returns consistent with market conditions.
The paper adds to the literature in two ways. First, due to the novelty and richness of the database at our disposal, we provide new evidence on the effects of the intensity of public ownership on venture capital investment strategies in Europe at an unparalleled level with respect to the extant studies in the field, which generally have a national focus or analyze limited samples.4 Second, we contribute methodologically to identifying the different factors that affect the observed outcomes of the investment activity of hybrid VC funds. From a methodological perspective, this is far from an easy task when an empirical study is run on funds that are still operating at the time of the analysis.
The results indicate that even after controlling for the funds’ and the portfolio firms’ characteristics, as well as for the financial market’s conditions, the level of public ownership affects the selection of investments and their subsequent management. In this paper, we use the incidence of write-offs to look at the ex-ante selection process for the target companies, while we focus on the timing of the exit to examine their post-investment management. We find that (i) the level of public ownership shows a weak negative correlation with the likelihood of observing a write-off, and (ii) a higher public share is associated with a longer duration for the investment. The latter effect is more relevant for those investments that generate intermediate financial returns. We argue that these firms are retained in a fund’s portfolio – even if their return profile might not be completely satisfactory from a private investor’s perspective – because they are expected to generate significant additional social returns.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the previous research on the rationales and effects of direct public intervention in the VC industry. Section 3 clarifies our research setting and proposes testable hypotheses. Section 4 introduces the datasets and the summary statistics. Section 5 presents the econometric models used and discusses the results. In Section 6, we draw conclusions and explain the implications of our findings.
Section snippets
Rationales and effects of direct public intervention in the VC market
Public venture capital initiatives have been deployed in numerous countries to channel and allocate public financial support to entrepreneurial firms. A large body of research has contributed to identifying successful experiences, the critical aspects for designing effective policy initiatives and any possible distortions derived from public involvement in the venture capital market (Lerner, 1999, Maula and Murray, 2003, Avnimelech and Teubal, 2006, Cumming and MacIntosh, 2006, Cumming, 2007,
Hypotheses and research setting
In this paper, we examine the impact of the intensity of public ownership on the investment strategies adopted by venture capital funds with respect to the previously outlined hypotheses. Because we have no information on the fundraising activity of our sample funds, we are not able to test the seeding hypothesis or the possible crowding out effect of private investments.
At the highest level of generality, this paper engages with two important issues.
First, we are interested in verifying
Dataset
The dataset includes 179 funds that invested in 2482 European companies between 1998 and 2007. Each of these funds raised part of its invested capital from the European Investment Fund (EIF).
Empirical analysis and results
The empirical analysis is based on two complementary approaches. First, we perform a set of probit models to investigate the impact of the level of public ownership (in the related VC funds) on the probability that a target company results in a write-off. This modeling approach is meant to capture the criteria that underlie the investment selection process by hybrid funds, controlling for contingent factors that are related to the characteristics of target firms, the investing funds and the
Conclusions
In this paper, we investigate the impact of public ownership levels on the investment strategies of hybrid VC funds. In particular, the empirical analysis is focused on observing the likelihood of write-offs and the timing of exits. The results suggest that different levels of public ownership are associated with significantly different investment patterns. More specifically, the joint observation of the results from the probit and the duration models suggest that higher public stakes are
Acknowledgments
We gratefully acknowledge the support from the STAREBEI project promoted by the European Investment Bank. We are indebted to Monjanel Gauthier (European Investment Fund) for providing us with EIF dataset. The views expressed are those of the authors and are not necessarily shared by the European Investment Fund.
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