Copyright © 1996 Published by Elsevier Science Inc.
Heuristics and normative models of judgment under uncertainty*1
Available online 9 February 1999.
Abstract
Psychological evidence shows that probability theory is not a proper descriptive model of intuitive human judgment. Instead, some heuristics have been proposed as such a descriptive model. This paper argues that probability theory has limitations even as a normative model. A new normative model of judgment under undertainty is designed under the assumption that the system's knowledge and resources are insufficient with respect to the questions that the system needs to answer. The proposed heuristics in human reasoning can also be observed in this new model, and can be justified according to the assumption.
Author Keywords: subjective probability; normative and descriptive models; heuristics and bias; insufficient knowledge and resources; nonaxiomatic reasoning system
Article Outline
Corresponding author. Address correspondence to Dr. Pei Wang, 510 North Fess, Bloomington, IN 47408.
*1 This work is supported by a research assistantship from the Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.






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