Abstract
Purchase PDF (707 K)
E-mail Article
Add to my Quick Links
Cited By in Scopus (5)
Purchase PDF (88 K)
doi:10.1016/0888-613X(93)90022-6 
Copyright © 1993 Published by Elsevier Science Inc.
On dynamics of cautious belief and conditional objects*1
References and further reading may be available for this article. To view references and further reading you must purchase this article.
Received 1 July 1991;
Abstract
The concept of knowledge or belief so important in Artificial Intelligence (AI) has been discussed in depth by philosophers, exemplified by Gärdenfors [1]. Whereas it is useful to have a broad view on the topic, it is also necessary to look at concrete models (eg, numerical modeling of degrees of belief). In this paper, we will discuss the cautious aspect of Shafer's approach to belief modeling and investigate conditionals in the context of belief dynamics. In particular, we show that Dempster's rule of conditioning produces the least committed belief function among the set of belief functions generated by conditional objects, thus providing a justification for its use.
Author Keywords: Belief functions; transferable belief model; dynamics of belief states; conditional objects; Dempster's rule of conditioning
Article Outline
Corresponding author. Address correspondence to Philippe Smets, IRIDIA, Université Libre de Bruxelles, 50 Avenue Franklin Roosevelt, C.P. 194/6, B-1050 , Brussels, , Belgium.
*1 The following text presents some research results of the Belgian National incentive program for fundamental research in artificial intelligence initiated by the Belgian State, Prime Minister's Office, Science Policy Programming. Scientific responsibility is assumed by the authors. Research work has been partly supported by the DRUMS project which is funded by a grant from the Commission of the European Communities under the ESPRIT II Program, Basic Research Project 3085.
