Tax evasion and heuristics: A research note
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Cited by (81)
Private firms’ tax aggressiveness and lightweight pre-tax-audit interventions by the tax administration
2023, Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and TaxationAudits, audit effectiveness, and post-audit tax compliance
2022, Journal of Economic Behavior and OrganizationCitation Excerpt :However, these theories make conflicting predictions on the effect of audits on subsequent compliance. First, audited taxpayers might assess the probability of a future audit by the ease of recalling their previous audit (Spicer and Hero, 1985). This availability heuristic (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973) predicts that the audit effectiveness (or the share of undeclared income that the tax agency detected in an audit) of a previous audit should affect a taxpayer's assessment of the risk of a future audit.
Impact of institutional environment quality on tax evasion: A comparative investigation of old versus new EU members
2018, Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and TaxationCitation Excerpt :More recent studies investigate the determinants of tax evasion (Chau & Leung, 2009; Khlif & Achek, 2015; Pickhardt & Prinz, 2014; Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004; Richardson, 2006), and the impact of culture on tax evasion (Putnam, Abdelfattah, Bagchi, & Braun, 2016; Réthi, 2012; Richardson, 2008; Tsakumis et al., 2007). Political perspectives (Feld & Tyran, 2002; Katz & Owen, 2013) and behavioural aspects of tax evasion have also been analyzed (Wenzel, 2005, Casal, Kogler, Mittone, & Kirchler, 2016; Groenland & Van Veldhoven, 1983; Kaplanoglou & Rapanos, 2015; Litina & Palivos, 2016; Pickhardt & Prinz, 2014; Spicer & Hero, 1985; Torgler & Valev, 2010). Several studies adopt the Slippery Slope Framework, a tax compliance model that links tax payments to the level of trust in governments and the power of tax authorities (Kastlunger, Lozza, Kirchler, & Schabmann, 2013; Kirchler, Hoelzl, & Wahl, 2008; Wahl, Kastlunger, & Kirchler, 2010).
The bomb-crater effect of tax audits: Beyond the misperception of chance
2017, Journal of Economic PsychologyCitation Excerpt :As a matter of fact, the link between prior audits and compliance has been the subject of a large body of experimental studies. As documented by Maciejovsky, Kirchler, and Schwarzenberger (2007), the traditional experimental literature (e.g. Spicer & Hero, 1985; Webley, 1987) shows that compliance increases with the personal experience of being audited. A possible explanation is the so-called availability-heuristic effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1975) which can be defined as the increase that prior audits generate in the subjective salience of audits and punishments, which leads to more compliance in the future.
Commitment to tax compliance: Timing effect on willingness to evade
2016, Journal of Economic PsychologyThe impact of safety audit timing and framing of the production outcomes on safety-related rule violations in a simulated production environment
2015, Safety ScienceCitation Excerpt :With respect to the impact of audit timing, it can be assumed that safety audits that are implemented comparatively early on lead to significantly fewer rule violations, as people will easily remember their last audit experience and will overestimate the probability of future audits. The impact of audit experience on the amount of rule violations committed afterwards has already been investigated in the context of tax evasion (Spicer and Hero, 1985; Mittone, 2006). In the investigation by Spicer and Hero (1985), participants had the possibility to violate a rule in a total of 10 rounds.