The economics of corruption

doi:10.1016/0047-2727(75)90017-1

Journal of Public Economics

Volume 4, Issue 2, February 1975, Pages 187-203

https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(75)90017-1 Get rights and content

Abstract

This paper considers the relationship between market structure and the incidence of corrupt dealings in the government contracting process. Three cases are analyzed. We first deal with a situation in which government preferences are well-defined and many firms compete for the contract; we then contrast this case with one in which government preferences are ‘vague’ and finally eliminate the competitive assumption to consider the case of bilateral monopoly. It is then possible to consider the extent to which various criminal sanctions will deter corruption and the degree to which criminal incentives can be reduced by revising contracting procedures and reorganizing market structures.

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Prices and wages under bilateral monopoly
Quarterly Journal of Economics
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There are more references available in the full text version of this article.

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^∗: The author wishes to thank Robert Inman, Robert Pollak and the referees of this journal for helpful suggestions. Kent Bernard provided the requisite legal research.

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The economics of corruption

Abstract

Crime and punishment: An economic approach

Journal of Political Economy

The economics of bargaining

Inside bureaucracy

Prices and wages under bilateral monopoly

Quarterly Journal of Economics