The ratio equilibrium and a voting game in a public goods economy

doi:10.1016/0022-0531(77)90001-1

Journal of Economic Theory

Volume 16, Issue 2, December 1977, Pages 123-136

https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(77)90001-1 Get rights and content

Abstract

An economic model of the allocation process with public goods is presented. We define a concept of equilibrium and prove the existence. Next we present a voting game in which a level of the public goods to be produced is decided. We prove that the core of the voting game and the equilibria exist simultaneously, and that they coincide.

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The ratio equilibrium and a voting game in a public goods economy

Abstract

J. Econ. Theory

J. Econ. Theory

J. Econ. Theory

Social Choice and Individual Values

On the rationale of group decision-making

J. Political Econ.

The Demand and Supply of Public Goods

On the Cores in Economies with Public Goods

How to share the cost of a public good?

Int. J. Game Theory

A limit theorem on the core of an economy

Int. Econ. Rev.

Social decisions without social preferences

Stability of voting

Econometrica

A generalization of the pure theory of public goods

Amer. Econ. Rev.