The privatisation process in France and the U.K.☆

We produce the first study to explore the effect of political money contributions on IPOs. Exploiting a hand-collected database, we show that both lobbying and PAC expenditure pay off on issue day as donors incur less underpricing, an effect that can be amplified by contribution size and strategic targeting of recipients. Investigating the causes in multiple channels, we also associate donor IPOs with negative offer price revisions and lower aftermarket volatility. Collectively, our results offer new empirical grounding to the information asymmetry theory.

While a number of countries have tried the use of sealed bid share auctions for initial public offerings (IPOs), few continue to use them. This is a puzzle, since auctions have been successfully used in a variety of situations for other financial securities, particularly for the sale of government bonds. We provide an explanation for this puzzle: Bidding in sealed bid auctions for new issues is complex, particularly when the underlying shares are difficult to value and the auction is open to large numbers of potential bidders, some of whom might be naïve. Participation fluctuations make it difficult for even sophisticated bidders to shave accurately for the winner’s curse, and mistakes by some bidders impose costs on all. Our findings suggest that a hybrid auction mechanism that limits participation in the auction tranche to sophisticated investors, along with a non-competitive tranche that is open to all investors, can reduce such mistakes while at the same time providing the necessary incentives for information gathering.

Using hand-collected data on IPOs by private-owned enterprises, this article examines the regulatory benefits of political connections in China's state-controlled going public process, a subject that has rarely been investigated in existing literature. This article makes the following findings: first, political connections have significant positive impact on enterprises' chances of being approved for IPOs; second, enterprises with political connections are significantly more likely to receive preferential treatments (e.g., higher offering price-to-earning ratio) from regulatory authorities; third, enterprises with political connections are significantly less likely to be selected for pre-IPO on-site auditing by regulatory authorities. The findings of this article may provide answer to the question why China has been so reluctant to adopt disclosure-based regulatory regime as well as insights into the puzzle of the consistent poor performance of China's stock markets.

This study investigates underpricing of IPOs in Sri Lanka. On average, IPOs are underpriced by 34%. Small issues are more underpriced than large issues, and privatization issues are more underpriced than conventional issues. Investor sentiment is positively related with underpricing and affects small and large issues similarly. Small privatization issues are more underpriced than large privatization issues and partially explain the asymmetry in underpricing between small and large issues. However, even after controlling for investor sentiment, privatization, hot-market conditions, underwriter-size, and industry, small issues remain more underpriced than large issues. The results strongly support the uncertainty hypothesis for larger underpricing of small issues, and privatization issues.

We document the phenomenon of under-pricing initial public offerings (IPOs) for 47 Gulf firms that went public between 2001 and 2006. The IPOs had, on average, initial abnormal returns of 290 percent, far exceeding those documented for both developed and emerging markets. In aftermarket performance, we find that these IPOs provide investors with negative abnormal returns over a one-year period, which seems to be consistent with findings in other industrial and emerging markets. The empirical models fail, however, to provide us with a satisfactory explanation using the common independent variables employed in the literature. Nevertheless, it appears that country- and industry-specific characteristics, in addition to the timing of the offers, play a key role in explaining IPO behavior in the region. This paper's empirical findings support the hypothesis that investors are initially over-optimistic about an IPO's performance, but grow more pessimistic over time.

We examine how political connections impact the process of going public. Specifically, we test how political connections impact the pricing of the newly offered shares, the magnitude of underpricing, and the fixed cost of going public. Based on the experience of the newly public firms from Chinese security markets and using multiple measures of political connections, we find robust evidence that the issuing firms with political connections reap significant preferential benefits in the process of going public. To be specific, we find that firms – irrespective of their ownership status – with greater political connections have relatively higher offering price, lower underpricing, and lower fixed costs during the going-public process.