Habitat conservation, wildlife extraction and agricultural expansion
Introduction
Wildlife is threatened by many factors, of which habitat conversion to other uses (such as agriculture and urban development) and human (over) exploitation are best known and most notorious. According to the World Conservation Monitoring Center [42], of 486 documented extinctions since 1600, 80 have resulted from hunting and 98 have resulted from habitat destruction. Over-exploitation, usually combined with habitat destruction, is believed to threaten about one-third of the world's endangered mammals and birds.
Interestingly, wildlife exploitation and habitat conversion choices differ significantly across societies so that the worldwide distribution of “nature” varies considerably. Some countries host the bulk of nature and biodiversity whereas others have converted their natural assets in the past or are currently doing so [42]. Consider recent land use developments in Kenya and Southern Africa as an example. Child [10] concludes “Kenya's wildlife is in trouble” whereas wildlife “thrives” in Southern Africa. In less than 20 years, private South African land allocated to wildlife has increased from 1 to 8 million hectares (compared to 2.8 million hectares controlled by the National Parks Board). In Kenya, during the same period, wildlife was excluded from large areas of its traditional habitat to minimize competition for forage with livestock and to protect and promote the expansion of arable agriculture [25]. As a result, Kenyan herbivore populations have declined by 40–60% since 1977 while South African wildlife populations have increased. A number of factors contribute to these differences in conservation choices, including differences in population pressures [35], property rights and use rights for land and wildlife resources [9], and fiscal policies—particularly those promoting agricultural expansion [28]. However, conservation choices differ even in societies with similar property rights regimes and agricultural expansion policies. It is important to understand why this may occur, particularly in less developed regions where property rights are ill defined and conversion of “nature” is an important issue.
South African experiences suggest that wildlife exploitation and conservation efforts do not necessarily conflict. Indeed, allowing (local) people to utilize wildlife as a renewable resource may trigger incentives to carefully manage wildlife as a valuable asset and to allocate scarce land to its survival. The so-called integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs) are based on this notion and are financially supported by hundreds of millions of dollars by organizations such as the World Bank [3]. ICDPs are increasingly promoted to encourage communities on the periphery of natural habitat to sustainably harvest wildlife, possibly in return for alternate sources of income or sustenance. Barrett and Arcese [3], [4] critically assess the potential long-run benefits of such programs, concluding that the design of ICDPs over the past decade leaves much to be desired.
This paper contributes to the understanding of development policies and wildlife conservation by explicitly modeling the role of habitat and spillover benefits. One objective is to investigate why, under conditions of ill-defined property rights for habitat and wildlife resources, some societies preserve wildlife at the expense of agricultural expansion, while others expand agricultural lands at the expense of conservation. We find that multiple equilibria may lead to an outcome with little habitat and wildlife or, in contrast, with little agricultural conversion and abundant wildlife stocks.1 In particular, we find conservation choices may be driven by spillover effects that are somewhat analogous to those of the “big push” literature in development economics (e.g., [22]). We identify situations in which a “little pull” can encourage conservation and increase economic well being by creating backward and forward linkages in the wildlife sector that promote economic expansion. This can be interpreted as theoretical support for ICDPs and for the efforts of organizations such as Africa Resources Trust to promote wildlife utilization by local people.
Another objective is to investigate the effects of conservation and agricultural expansion policies when property rights remain ill-defined. For example, trade measures to promote wildlife conservation may achieve the opposite result, depending on the particular steady state that the system is in. We also find that ill-conceived domestic policies to expand agriculture may make everyone in the economy worse off. Accordingly, conservation and development policies should be jointly considered and implemented with great care.
Finally, we evaluate the often-heard claim that lack of property rights is a major cause of excessive resource depletion. We compare wildlife stocks under conditions of open access and cooperative common property management, finding that open access stock levels may exceed socially optimal levels. Thus, it is too simple to equate ill-defined property rights with over-exploitation. We are not familiar with existing literature arriving at this conclusion.
Section snippets
Existing literature on wildlife management
Given the obvious relation between natural habitat availability and the potential for wildlife exploitation, it makes sense to capture both in a single model. However, the early focus of bioeconomic models (e.g., [11]) was on marine resources, so the bioeconomic literature did not initially focus much attention on the opportunity cost of conservation, or the potential earnings from alternative uses of the resource base. (It was tacitly assumed that there are no profitable alternative uses for
A simple model of wildlife and habitat dynamics
Consider a group of people who earn a living by hunting wildlife or growing crops (or alternatively raise livestock).4 Crops are perishable and are traded in local (regional) markets. Wildlife
Multiple equilibria
In this section we analyze the steady states defined by (12) and (13). The phase diagram for the system is presented in Fig. 1 for one set of parameters for which α<γ/q. To the right of the dA/dt=0 isocline, hunting is more profitable than cropping and some farmers will abandon their fields which convert back to habitat. The opposite occurs to the left of the dA/dt=0 isocline. Above the dx/dt=0 isocline, the reduction in habitat reduces resource productivity and, even though hunting effort is
Economic linkages and steady state comparisons
Income and total revenues are larger in the λ steady state than in the μ steady state. Average revenues from agriculture are larger if the land base is small (due to a concave revenue function for cropping), and therefore agricultural income (average return to labor) in λ strictly dominates income in μ. Because people are indifferent between both activities in any steady state, it must hold that everybody is better off in the nature scenario. (Since x(λ)>x(μ), it is also clear that pqx(λ)>pqx(μ
Population growth, habitat and wildlife
Communities at the periphery of natural habitat in developing countries typically do not face perfect markets for all factors and commodities. It is well documented that transaction costs (e.g., search costs and transport costs) drive a wedge between purchase and sale prices and may indeed render some transactions uneconomic altogether [30]. The model developed above deals with the case of a “missing labor market,” which is clearly an extreme case of market failure, albeit not unrealistic for
Comparative statics
We now consider the comparative statics of the above-mentioned steady states, and the potential implications of policy-related efforts to alter the parameters of the system. As mentioned above, there may be scope for promoting sustainable exploitation by implementing well-targeted policies in this second best world. The main results are summarized in Table 1.
The results for λ and μ in Table 1 are of opposite sign, or ambiguous for the cases involving q and γ. Indeed, the comparative statics are
Open access and common property compared
Until now we have assumed that exploitation of wildlife and habitat takes place under conditions of open access. While this may be realistic for some regions, it is well known that cooperation among users (or regulated common property management) may potentially result in outcomes that are close to the social optimum (e.g., [1], [24]). If certain conditions are satisfied—possibly related to group size, homogeneity and trust—society could decide jointly on management and realize a welfare gain.
Conclusions, discussion and policy implications
Using a fairly simple model, we have shown how different patterns of conservation and agricultural expansion might emerge in less developed countries. Specifically, such differences may reflect the multiple equilibria that might arise when property rights are not well defined and the opportunity cost of harvesting is endogenous.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, we obtain three primary results. First, equilibria with greater conservation and less agriculture may be Pareto superior to equilibria
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Dave Abler, Chuck Mason, Aart de Zeeuw, two anonymous referees, an associate editor and seminar participants at the University of Wyoming for helpful comments and suggestions. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Environment and Development Second International Conference, Stockholm, September 2000. Erwin Bulte would like to thank the Royal Dutch Academy of Arts and Sciences for financial support. Rick Horan would like to thank the Michigan
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