The competitive allocation process is informationally efficient uniquely
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Cited by (67)
An axiomatic characterization of the price–money message mechanism for economies with satiation
2019, Journal of Mathematical EconomicsCitation Excerpt :2. Endowing the differentiable structure with the message and commodity spaces, we will be able to obtain the same dimension-theoretic results as in Propositions 3–6 in Sonnenschein (1974) that will provide an informational efficiency theorem like Hurwicz (1960), Mount and Reiter (1974), and Osana (1978) as well as the uniqueness theorem of competitive message mechanisms like Jordan (1982). These will be, however, the subjects of further investigations.
Fractional matching markets
2016, Games and Economic BehaviorCitation Excerpt :The competitive solution has been central in addressing similar concerns for exchange economies. It is both informationally efficient (Hurwicz, 1977; Osana, 1978; Jordan, 1982) as well as decentralizeable (Sonnenschein, 1974).6 The analysis in this paper highlights the fact that pairs in a matching model are a sort of club good (Buchanan, 1965).
Competitive Market Mechanisms as Social Choice Procedures
2011, Handbook of Social Choice and WelfareAnts and nonoptimal self-organization: Lessons for macroeconomics
2014, Macroeconomic DynamicsIs socialism back? A review of contemporary economic literature
2023, Journal of Economic SurveysA Review of Robert Sugden’s Community of Advantage
2022, Journal of Economic Literature
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I would like to thank Professors L. Hurwicz and S. Reiter for stimulating conversations. This research was supported by NSF Grant SOC 77-07852. Any remaining errors are my own.