Abstract
In this paper, I will suggest an unorthodox hybrid theory of ethical justification that combines, on an ontological level, a realist approach with constructivist elements. On an epistemological level, the realist part of the theory will be squared with an intuitionist account. Eventually, the suggested hybrid theory will take the form of an intuitionist ethics of persons. I will start with briefly sketching the ontological shape of the relevant concept of person whereby I will extensively draw on Kant and endorse a realist reading of his ethical theory (2.). Subsequently, I will explain why and how constructivist elements must complement the picture (3.). Then, I will focus on the epistemological shape of the theory. In particular, I will suggest an intuitionist reading of Kant’s doctrine of “the fact of reason” (4.). Next, I will briefly comment on classical intuitionism and on Bernard William’s notion of convergence in ethics (5.). Subsequently, I will compare my approach with Robert Audi’s attempt to refine a Rossian type of intuitionism (6.). Finally, I will revisit the charge of dogmatism that has traditionally been raised against intuitionism (7.).
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Notes
I have presented a more elaborate version of this account in Heinrichs 2013.
In her Essay Realism and Constructivism in Twentieth-Century Moral Philosophy (2008), Korsgaard has refined her view. In particular, she highlights that the difference between realism and constructivism does not lie in their views about the truth-values of moral sentences. The difference remains, according to Korsgaard, in their understanding of the function of concepts.
Quotations of Kant’s work are based on the editions indicated at the end of the paper, including the used abbreviations. Volume and page numbers refer to the Akademie-Ausgabe.
Notably, this also means that non-human animals are not part of the “moral community” (at least if they do not qualify as persons). However, this does not necessarily imply that we do not have duties to non-human animals. In Fellow Creatures: Kantian Ethics and Our Duties to Animals Christine Korsgaard develops a constructivist argument which is compatible with the present approach. There she maintains: “In taking ourselves to be ends-in-ourselves we legislate that the natural good of a creature who matters to itself is the source of normative claims. Animal nature is an end-in-itself, because our own legislation makes it so. And that is why we have duties to the other animals.” (Korsgaard 2004, 106).
Platts has coined a concise formula for characterizing moral realism: “[…] if a moral judgement is true, it is true in virtue of the (independently existing) real world, and is true in virtue of that alone.” (Platts 1979, 243).
“It is impossible to think of anything at all in the world, or indeed even beyond it, that could be considered good without limitation except a good will.” (GMM, AA 4, 393).
This may be taken merely as an epistemological claim. Then it is, of course, compatible with “strong” versions of ethical realism. If, however, our (present) understanding of the conditio humana partly constitutes material ethical principles, then they are constructions in a sense that is incompatible with “strong” ethical realism.
A constructivist element can be found in the following passage: “The aim of ethical thought, however, is to help us to construct a world that will be our world, one in which we have a social, cultural, and personal life.” (Williams 1993, 111). A realist element is – as Korsgaard has correctly observed – noticeable in the phrase “best social world for human beings” (Williams 1993, 155).
Sometimes Williams is seen as a proponent of a Neo-Aristotelian type of ethics. A number of passages in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy are suitable to confirm this categorization. Williams himself, however, has spoken critically against this (Williams 1996, 213).
“Contractual ethical theory cannot provide the basic method of understanding ethics, because it needs itself to be understood. If applied too widely, it does not give any, or enough, results; applied too narrowly, it insistently raises the question of the special conditions required to make it appropriate.” (Williams 1993, 104).
Hans Joas has recently presented a historical and sociological study in which he suggests to consider universal human rights as the result of a specific process of sacralization, i. e. a history of sacralization of person (Joas 2011, 18). This is another way of describing the conversion in ethics. Moreover, Joas strives to keep the concepts of construction and discovery at an equal distance. This means that in metaethical terms he is committing himself neither to realism nor to constructivism (Joas 2011, 15). Nevertheless his study can be seen as a socio-historical support for the hybrid theory outlined here.
This does not mean that there is no way of justifying or giving evidence for this fact. One could, for example, use a counterfactual conditional (“Suppose persons do not have dignity, then…”) to defend that persons have dignity. Such an analysis could, of course, be useful. It would, however, not lead to premises from which the proposition in question could be logically inferred.
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Heinrichs, B. Realism, Constructivism, and Intuitionism. Outline of an Unorthodox Hybrid Theory. ZEMO 1, 263–277 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s42048-018-0019-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s42048-018-0019-7