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(Social) Metacognition and (Self-)Trust

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Abstract

What entitles you to rely on information received from others? What entitles you to rely on information retrieved from your own memory? Intuitively, you are entitled simply to trust yourself, while you should monitor others for signs of untrustworthiness. This article makes a case for inverting the intuitive view, arguing that metacognitive monitoring of oneself is fundamental to the reliability of memory, while monitoring of others does not play a significant role in ensuring the reliability of testimony.

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Notes

  1. The cue-based/knowledge-based distinction is not quite the same as Koriat’s distinction between experience-based and theory-based metacognition (Koriat 2006), since there is no requirement that sensitivity to cues manifest itself in the form of a feeling.

  2. Jost et al. (1998) also refer to social metacognition, but they justify this by employing an extremely broad definition of metacognition as involving “any aspect of thinking about thinking”, a definition so broad as to include many entirely disparate phenomena; my conception of social metacognition is much narrower.

  3. As Gelfert has argued (Gelfert 2009), reliance on type 2 monitoring may result in local reductionism collapsing into Reidian credulism, as the sort of innate, subpersonal mechanisms on which type 2 monitoring relies are the very mechanisms invoked by Reid to explain how testimonial knowledge is acquired. This objection is compatible with my argument here.

  4. I rely mainly on Fricker (1994, 1995), but see Fricker (2002, 2004, 2006a, b, c) for recent developments of the view. I have provided a detailed reconstruction of Fricker’s epistemology elsewhere Michaelian (2010); I rely on that reconstruction here without defending it.

  5. While Fricker is an internalist, she acknowledges the importance of reliability, at least as I read her. I set aside the internalist (coherentist) aspect of her argument, as this is irrelevant given MEF. There is also a modal aspect to Fricker’s argument—the blindly trusting subject is supposed to be gullible not only in the sense that her beliefs are formed by an unreliable process but also in the sense that they are unsafe or insensitive. I set this aspect of the argument aside here, as I have dealt with it elsewhere Michaelian (2010).

  6. I rely here on the more detailed critique given in Michaelian (2012a).

  7. Douven and Cuypers (2009) similarly point out that Fricker may overestimate the availability of cues to untrustworthiness.

  8. As noted in Section 4.4.1 below, what affects the reliability of testimonial belief formation is not the overall reliability of evaluations of testimony as honest or dishonest but rather the reliability specifically of evaluations of testimony as honest; but the finding of poor deception detection accuracy establishes that monitoring for deception is not effective, so I set this aside for now.

  9. The accuracy rate needs to be relativized to the base rate of 50 % honest statements; I come back to this below.

  10. Sperber et al. (2010) argue that some of the information required for detection of deception is necessarily acquired in the course of interpretation of communication. But this only goes so far in cutting down the cost of monitoring for dishonesty—meaningful monitoring will clearly require cognitive resources beyond those required for mere comprehension of an utterance. And even where the information is available, resources will still be required to do something with it.

  11. I draw here on Clark and Chalmers’ paper on the extended mind hypothesis (Clark and Chalmers 1998), discussed more fully in Michaelian (2012d), but this sort of picture is implicit in many philosophical discussions of memory (e.g., Burge 1993).

  12. In both the source problem and the process problem, there might be intermediate/indeterminate cases; I set these aside here.

  13. I draw here on Bernecker’s helpful discussion of memory markers in Bernecker (2008), noting where my approach overlaps with his.

  14. Making a different sort of phenomenological proposal, Audi (1995) suggests that remembering is distinguished from imagining by a feeling of having believed; since memory both stores non-endorsed representations and is capable of producing new representations and beliefs, however, this proposal is a non-starter.

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Acknowledgements

Thanks for comments and discussion to Joëlle Proust, Sam Wilkinson, two anonymous referees, and audiences at the Third Copenhagen Conference in Epistemology (Social Epistemology Research Group, Københavns Universitet), a meeting of the Filosofiska Föreningen at Lunds Universitet (organized by Frank Zenker), and the “Brains, Minds, and Language” workshop at Bogaziçi Üniversitesi (organized by Lucas Thorpe and Ali Salah).

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  1. Felsefe Bölümü, Bilkent Üniversitesi, FA Binası, Ankara, 06800, Turkey

    Kourken Michaelian

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  1. Kourken Michaelian
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Correspondence to Kourken Michaelian.

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Michaelian, K. (Social) Metacognition and (Self-)Trust. Rev.Phil.Psych. 3, 481–514 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-012-0099-y

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-012-0099-y

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